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The expansive proliferation of social media, electronic devices and data processing capabilities has 
presented Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) with a dilemma.  On the one hand there is a need 
for/opportunity to expand capability, adapting practices and policies to capitalise on what is now technically 
possible (not only in the application of data technology but also in the context of what can be achieved 
within the technical conventions of the law), utilising citizens’ data and actively encouraging their collation 
and sharing as part of everyday community policing.  On the other, the development in data technology has 
been accompanied by a rapid expansion in public expectation and a need for greater legal regulation, all 
combining to bring an important extension of police accountability.  The focus of the research is thus how 
can LEAs balance that which is technically possible against what is legally permissible and societally 
acceptable? 
 
Moving from the known to the needed, the published work draws upon and addresses the size and shape of 
the dilemma, identifying gaps and supplying  “evidence-informed management knowledge” (Tranfield et al 
2003) at both an individual and organisational level.  Providing a themed and coherent new praxis for LEAs 
the work identifies how LEAs must balance the availability of data with the rapidly increasing public 
expectations of privacy, security, confidentiality and accountability, collecting and connecting the qualitative 
knowledge and practice that resides in distributed places and people, in order to establish a previously 
unrecognised body of work that focuses on both opportunities and obligations, in order to promote an 
understanding of the ‘law in context’ and ultimately increase police effectiveness.  The direction of the work 
follows a series of influences and confluences, tributaries and deltas of change flowing towards the same 
unequivocal destination: an original contribution to “knowledge about the traditional elements of the law 





Tranfield, D., Denyer, D., Smart, P. 2003 “Towards a Methodology for Developing Evidence-Informed 
Management Knowledge by Means of Systematic Review” British Journal of Management vol 14 pp 207-222 
Langbroek, P., van den Bos, K., Thomas, S.M., Milo, M & van Rossum, W “Methodology of Legal Research: 

















Writing the foreword to mark the launch of the Blackstone’s Police Manuals - a series of professional 
knowledge texts that I researched, designed and authored for the police service (Sampson 1998) Chief 
Constable Peter Hermitage provides a backdrop to my specific work submitted here. Pointing out that: 
“Knowledge is a prerequisite for policing. If the police are to be effective players within the Criminal Justice 
System then they need to know and understand the legal framework in which they work.” Hermitage, as the 
first Director of National Police Training, identifies a clear link between the operational efficacy of Law 
Enforcement Agencies (LEA) and the extent to which their actors understand the legal parameters which 
delineate their operating environment.      Since the launch of the Blackstone’s Manuals both variables - 
knowledge and legal framework – have changed almost beyond recognition and the published work 
submitted here has sought to explore, identify, explain and apply one critical aspect of that prerequisite.   
 
Overview of Research Theme 
My research theme arises from the recognition that the proliferation of social media, the ubiquitous 
everyday use of portable electronic devices and the exponential expansion in capabilities for data processing 
have presented Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) with a fundamental dilemma.  Developments in data 
processing have brought both a pressing need and an unparalleled opportunity for LEAs to expand their 
capability, adapting practices and policies to capitalise on what is now technologically possible, not only 
utilising the yottabytes of citizens’ data now available to them cheaply and quickly, but also actively 
encouraging data sharing as part of everyday community policing.  At the same time, the burgeoning 
development in what can be achieved technologically has brought a rapid expansion in public expectation 
and legal regulation of data processing by the police who must work within the existing legal parameters 
most of which remain sets of ‘analogue’ rules to be applied in an increasingly digital world, all of which has 
become an important extension of police accountability.  My critical research question is how LEAs can begin 
to balance the triptych of that which is possible against what is permissible and acceptable and what specific 
legal knowledge is needed by practitioners, managers and their respective organizations. This is a new and 
rapidly developing area of accountability for LEAs and the body of work in which I answer the research 
question, identifying the direction of those developments, together with posited considerations and practical 
solutions, is an original contribution to knowledge.  
 
Theoretical Position 
The theoretical position from which I have approached my research question is this: that LEAs must	balance 
the technically possible against the legally permissible and societally acceptable in order to be publicly 
accountable.  Doing so requires a careful analysis of the component parts which can often operate in 
divergent and interdependent ways as set out in the diagram below: 
 
 














While each of the elements would lend a viable and valuable ‘lens’ through which to examine and evaluate 
the dilemma, the frame of reference from which I have chosen to apply my theoretical position and analyse 
the issues in my research question is primarily a legal and jurisprudential one.  The legal and jurisprudential 
aspect brings a mixed approach of both formal, synchronic objectivity in terms of the law as is and the 
subjective diachronic application of it to a set of given circumstances under consideration by a court, (see 
Methodology infra), linking with and representing a form of societal acceptability at least insofar as that is 
understood and given effect by the court.  This frame of reference thus addresses societal acceptability in 
this context, however some of the work also identifies how this concept extends far more widely as discussed 
in the practical projects such as ATHENA where participants in a 3-year research programme found some 
aspects of what was being proposed to represent an unacceptable request for LEA use of their data and also 
within my contribution to the Principles for Accountable Policing which followed on from my research.   
However, it is important to note that a subset of societal acceptability is political acceptability, both in 
general (in terms of ministerial accountability) and specifically in the setting of this policing areas having a 
governance model that centres around locally-elected officials.	 	 There is also that element of political 
possibility which manifests itself in the policy considerations driving legislation which in turn will extend/limit 
the use of new technologies.  The theoretical position of my work is therefore largely focused in the area 
represented by the asymmetrical directional arrows in the lower left quadrant of the diagram.  The socio-
political and technical interaction  - both formal and informal - as represented by the arrows in the bottom 







By way of practical illustration, on 8 September 2020 the elected PCC for Cleveland resigned unexpectedly 
and with immediate effect1.  The reason for his doing so was that he had been using a social media platform 
(WhatsApp) to conduct official business during the restrictions of the Covid-19 pandemic. The platform offers 
‘informal’ group conversation capabilities within a secure, end-to-end encrypted environment using 
participants’ own devices and offering as technically capable and suitable a solution as any formal data 
processing facility, thereby meeting the element of the technically possible.  There was nothing inherently 
‘unlawful’ in the use of this technology and in fact it had been used successfully by many public bodies during 
the pandemic, thus satisfying the element of formal legal permissibility.  The reason then why it impelled the 
resignation of the Commissioner was the third dimension, the informally unacceptable nature – politically, 
and more broadly societally - of his admitted use of the platform which enabled the routine deletion of 
messages at the end of each week.  While it might be argued that this deletion practise was itself in accord 
with legal data protection protocols and international framework for data retention, the societal aspects of 
this data solution were to prove fatal to his continuing in office as a publicly accountable police and crime 
commissioner.  And this vignette encapsulates precisely the dilemma for LEAs identified and addressed 
throughout my work.  
 
Identifying the specific legal issues that my research question presents for LEAs, my work has delineated the 
extent and implications of the relevant knowledge requirement in order that operators can know and 
understand the law and legal framework when balancing the technically possible against the strictures of 
legal permissibility and the risks of societally acceptable in order to be publicly accountable.  The submitted 
work achieves this in the following way:  
 
First I have identified the dilemma itself, illustrating how it has emerged in criminological form from within 
the wider meta-evolution that has taken place within the communities on whose behalf the police operate 
and on whose active cooperation the police depend. Secondly, my research has identified and illustrated 
how, in order for LEAs to improve capability and exploit opportunity (the ‘possible’), many well-established, 
taken-for granted, legal considerations within the current ‘knowledge requirement’ for police officers 
(Hermitage 1998) will need to be revisited, technical considerations such as jurisdiction over criminal 
offences, rules of evidence and the role of criminal intelligence, the availability of inculpatory data sets that 
may prove – or disprove – criminal liability, the data entitlements of suspects and citizens at large and even 
fundamental human rights such as those preserved for remand prisoners to examine and understand the 
case against them.  My work shows how, where and why these ‘givens’ need to be re-evaluated against the 
technological realities of the context in which the police now operate.  Former staples of criminal 
investigation (a geographically static crime scene, an offender with a single, verifiable identity etc.) will have 
to be re-thought in the setting of Big Data capabilities, cyber crime and cyber-enabled crime.   
 
Turning next to the dilemma’s second aspect (‘permissible’), I have researched and identified new areas of 
law such as those governing the collation, protection and processing of citizens’ data and how they have 
brought specific requirements for LEAs which they must understand if they are to be effective, along with 
further challenges in the areas of intelligence, prosecution and accountability, requirements and challenges 
which, if left unaddressed, will have a significant impact on the ability of LEAs to meet the first aspect of the 





And finally, I explore and address the dilemma’s third aspect: what are the boundaries within which society 
expects the police to operate (‘acceptable’).  The litigation literature demonstrates a growing unease and 
mistrust of LEAs as Big Data capabilities have grown, a feature borne out by my own research.   
 
In identifying and illustrating the dilemma, defining the legal parameters and proposing very practical new 
ways of achieving a balance, my published work tracks the dilemma from the genesis of the conundrum with 
the arrival of community crime mapping in which I was involved in 2009/10, the early challenges of legal 
‘technicalities’ such as jurisdiction represented by ‘cyberspace’, the subsequent developments in community 
demand for access to wider data sets held by the police and the rapid ‘digitization’ of communities, through 
practical settings such as criminal intelligence and social media, building towards a substantial example of the 
legal framework in action (in a three-year European Commission funded project) and culminating in a multi-
jurisdictional research programme to produce a taxonomy of Principles for Accountable Policing across 
democratic societies in which the research theme is specifically enshrined.  This then is the research theme.  
My methodology and method are set out below. 
 
Research Methodology 
“A precondition for legal research in any form has become that the researcher should not only have 
knowledge about the traditional elements of the law, but also about the quickly changing societal, political, 
economic and technological contexts and, possibly, other aspects of relevance.” (Langbroek et al. 2017) 
[emphasis added].  
 
My work both follows and exemplifies this observation particularly in relation to the socio-political and 
technological issues as described above. Although legal rules are necessarily expressed in general terms as 
Hart’s (1961) well-understood ‘open texture’, I have not been engaged here in classical nomothetic legal 
research to identify general laws of equal applicability but have very much focussed on the application of a 
complex system of established ‘analogue’ laws and principles within the rapidly developing digital societal, 
political and technological “contexts” as they affect the law enforcement community.  This has necessitated 
an idiographic approach in part, researching and analysing the facts of very specific events and cases and 
conducting an examination of the underpinning law before constructing an explication of how both individual 
data-specific laws and established general principles (pure law) can and must be deployed in these situations 
(applied law).   My published work has necessarily involved a combination of knowledge management 
methodology (Holsapple & Joshi 2002) and legal research (Arthurs 1983; Chynoweth 2008; Langbroek loc cit), 
identifying core critical legal knowledge, categorising and cataloguing laws, legal principles and cases; 
revealing both opportunities and obligations by processes of research and practice, positing solutions, 
evaluating options and promoting new approaches to individual, group and ultimately organisational 
effectiveness. 
 
Within the work there is an element of doctrinal research2 both below the horizontal axis (legal theory) and  
necessarily above it (expository) of the Arthurs legal research matrix at fig 1.  Such research is consistent with  
both the publication of ‘academic’ legal texts and the dominant form of legal research generally (Chynoweth).  
	
2 adopting a definition of doctrine as “a synthesis of various rules principles or norms interpretive guidelines 















Utilising both Arthurs’ (op cit) internal approaches – doctrinal research methodologies studying the texts of 
the law from the inside (‘what the law is’) and external approaches - empirical research methodologies 
studying how that law works in societal contexts from the outside I have researched the specific legal issues 
identified and encapsulated in my research theme.  I have applied the doctrinal rules, principles and norms 
to create interpretive guidelines for practitioners, the LEA ‘actors’ operating within the applicable socio-
legal contexts.  In this way the published body of work proceeds by applying coherently not just one but a 
combination of legal rules to a given set of facts, either naturally arising in the ordinary course of the 
criminal justice system, or within the careful design of wider research projects in which I have been 
involved.  In this way I have attempted to move the discussions towards the upper left quadrant of Arthurs’ 
model and offer my contribution as principally ‘law reform research’, with the studies being 
interdisciplinary in nature and having an express intention of bringing about change in policy and practice.  
 
	 11	
Chynoweth observes (ibid p35) “…it is probably incorrect to describe the process of legal analysis as being 
dictated by a ‘methodology’, at least in the sense in which that term is used in the sciences. The process 
involves an exercise in reasoning and a variety of techniques are used …  with the aim of constructing an 
argument which is convincing according to accepted, and instinctive, conventions of discourse within the 
discipline.” [emphasis added].  My published pieces of work proceed with precisely that aim: constructing 
a convincing line of argument within the knowledge requirement for law enforcement in England and 
Wales, evidenced and corroborated by the accepted conventions of discourse within the discipline of 
police law.  I have nevertheless proceeded with some care and trepidation given the suggestion from 
some that legal research and the epistemological origins of law are themselves unscientific and somehow 
subordinate to or “less dignified” (see Feldman 1989) than other areas of research. The challenge for me 
as legal researcher here has been that, beyond the necessary synchronic elements of the applicable law 
‘as it is now’, I have had to track how the relevant law has developed diachronically – particularly in our 
common law system and that of other jurisdictions – in order to predict how this may be applied to the 
rapidly evolving new digital contexts in which LEAs must work.  Adapting and adopting a well-established 
definition of knowledge management – the promotion of an integrated approach in identifying, 
capturing, evaluating, retrieving and sharing information assets, including case decisions, affidavits and 
pleadings in litigation, correspondence from the public, from decision-makers and policy leads; minutes 
and notes from meetings, strategic documents, policies, procedures, and previously uncaptured 
expertise and experience (Duhon loc cit) - my published work directly answers the research question by 
following a knowledge management approach and making a direct contribution to LEA’s understanding 
of the competing legal considerations arising from the digital dilemma.   
 
Research Method 
In the production of the publications that follow I have followed something close to classical action 
research (see Rapoport 1970) and utilised a five-stage model of diagnosing, action planning, action 
taking, evaluating and specifying learning.    Throughout the period of publication I have worked as a 
practising solicitor and chief executive within the policing sector, utilising the attendant opportunities to 
acquire qualitative data from internal reports, business cases, closed forum discussions, operational and 
organisational briefings and interviews with practitioners and executive level challenges to knowledge, 
understanding and performance management.  Having had access to practitioners, bloggers, technical 
data experts, senior leaders, politicians and policy makers, I have developed my work along a logical and 
focused progression, using the three principal ‘influences’ on knowledge management generally 
(managerial, resourcing and environmental – Holsapple & Joshi) led by practical need in an environment 
of conservatism and conventional policing methodologies rapidly being left behind by the ‘digitization’ of 
communities, scoping out the dilemma presented by the new capabilities/obligations/expectations for 
LEAs and critically evaluating how those LEAs will need to recognise and reconcile the legal issues I have 
identified.  In developing my work for publication I have been directly involved in the planned 
organisational change being sought, simultaneously creating that change and analysing its potential 
impact (per Baburoglu & Ravn 1992) identifying previously uncaptured expertise and experience in 
individual workers (per Duhon 1998) and, in the synthesis of the published work, I have set out my visions 
of best practice for effective operators in this most topical and controversial of policy areas.  The 
published works have been designed to address individual legal learning gaps revealed by my research at 
the level of the relevant practitioner, published within broader learning texts that fill much wider 
knowledge gaps within the technologically burgeoning environment and consolidating the knowledge in 
a way that is necessary for changes in formalised procedures to begin taking hold in their organisations 
(Belasen 2000; Jost & Bauer 2003).  In this I have gone beyond knowledge articulation and produced a 
themed original contribution to legal knowledge management in the advancement of police 
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effectiveness.  Professionally I trace a coherent and cohesive theme over an eight-year period, 
challenging the understanding and adequacy of extant legal frameworks, knowledge procedures and 
ethical/operational considerations by which LEAs are held accountable.  Academically these settings 
provided a practical locus for action research in which I designed and contributed to practitioner 
workshops, interviewed LEA operatives in various jurisdictions, conducted accountability and challenge 
meetings with experts in legal doctrine and practice, specialists in communications, technological, 
systems and policy fields across a wide range of jurisdictions. Working with trainers, supervisors, 
managers, fellow senior lawyers and executive leaders I monitored and evaluated LEAs’ responses to 
informatics, intelligence and innovation. Using the product of these extensive data gathering activities I 
identified the focused research questions, acquired and analysed available information, noting the results 
and applying the learning within areas of policy and practice using discrete published examples to bring 
the challenges and posited solutions to the intended audience.  The outcome is thus a product of careful 
and selective identification and inferential analyses of the legal considerations, the isolation and 
synthesis of the principles, existing law and doctrine with its inconsistencies and lacunae, consistent with 
the discipline of legal research. My method involved close scrutiny of the relevant legal provisions that 
were ‘in play’ within contemporary law enforcement activity and an analysis of the approach of the 
courts, both domestic and EU-wide  (in conjunction with selected academic discourse from the literature) 
to make diagnostic statements of the legal and ethical implications for LEAs in the course of which I 
collated real examples from the workplace, testing understanding and opinion, hypotheses and working 
assumptions against the prevailing legal norms, ethical expectations and the zeitgeist within LEA 
communities.   
 
Original Independent Contribution to Knowledge 
The publications form a coherent body of work, beginning with the early emergence of community 
demands for crime data sets that were formerly regarded as the exclusive property of LEAs and how the 
dilemma of balancing the possible with the permissible can be traced from this movement.  Having 
introduced this new societal context (Chynoweth) I then move to a series of socio-technological settings 
and examples, deliberately taking specific elements of contemporary policing in order to illustrate and 
develop the research theme for practitioners.  The topical relevance of this as the research theme’s 
backdrop and its genesis in crime mapping is directly corroborated by a RUSI research paper3.  Published at 
the same time as my summative publications (items 7 & 8) RUSI recommend that LEAs develop - as a 
matter of urgency - a decision making framework to ensure that they are “able to make effective use of [Big 
Data] capabilities without fear of violating citizens’ right to privacy”, particularly in the context of the next 
generation of crime mapping technology/methodology.  This is precisely what my body of work 
encapsulates and enables.  The evidence underpinning that claim and the relative contribution of each 
piece of work to the research theme is particularised in the following synopses. In terms of knowledge 
management, commentators have contended that all learning starts with individual learning and that 
effective individual (and group) learning has a generally positive impact on organisational learning (Lim et al 
2006).  My published work has been targeted largely at advancing the knowledge of the individual: the 
operational practitioner, the trainee and trainer, the supervisor and manager.  I believe that this impact has 
been amply made out in my submission.  Some specific examples include the use of my works in the 
development of training materials with overseas police forces such as the Abu Dhabi Police, the provision of 
workshops to LEA personnel and the development of professional knowledge by operational LEA expert 
managers from the WyFi team in West Yorkshire who worked within the CENTRIC research teams and who 





& the Humber police forces and the development of the ‘app’ for Europol to assist operation LEA agents to 
interpret and apply the Law Enforcement Directive when processing personal data.   Further impact is 
evident in the contribution made by my works to the Europe-wide research projects in which the University 
is a research partner, projects such as ATHENA (infra), AIDA (Artificial Intelligence and Data Analytics for LE) 
and most recently in my adaptation of the Peelian Principles in constructing the University’s bid for a 2-year 
research H2020 project to develop European legal and ethical principles for AI in Law Enforcement.   In 
addition, the sharing of the Principles for Accountable Policing with the College of Policing and with the 
governance bodies of An Garda Síochána and the City of Seattle Police Department following the public 
protests about policing governance in the US in 2020 also evidence the ongoing impact of my research 
work.  
	 
However, while the phenomenon of organisational learning is discursive and sometimes hard to delineate 
(Wang & Ahmed, 2003), I have also evidenced the contribution of my published work to this higher level as 
well as those of the individual and group.  My work has also been aimed directly at, and received by 
policymakers, senior executives, political leaders and researchers. Taking the perspective proposed by 
Belasen (2000) and Jost and Bauer (2003) -that learning at the organisational level involves consolidation of 
knowledge generated from the individual and group level which leads to changes in formalised procedures 
within an organisation – I believe I have evidenced a significant degree of consolidation, of meta-synthesis 
of knowledge achieving a significant tri-level impact.  Riege and Lindsay (2006) summarise the main drivers 
for the adoption of knowledge management in the public sector and contend that knowledge management 
initiatives can facilitate knowledge transfer and sharing among employees, adding to the ‘knowledge 
capital’ on which all employees, managers and supervisors can draw. A number of my works have been 
direct contributions to knowledge capital in the professional development of police officers and staff and 
the creation of learning and reference materials, but also in relation to policy making for groups and 
organisations and the prevailing culture.  Applying their (Riege and Lindsay) analysis of knowledge 
management I aver that my published works have improved, developed or updated existing knowledge 
repertoires and established new ones in a way that makes the existing knowledge within the boundaries of 
the organisation accessible and protected.  These feature strongly in my published work in which I have not 
simply protected but extended those boundaries and individual/organisational repertoires and made the 
composite legal arguments and references accessible to practitioners.  Relying on knowledge to inform 
decisions and policies should, they go on to argue, increase the likelihood of success and achieving the 
desired outcomes and make the decision-making process transparent and coherent.  Placing the relevant 
legal knowledge at the heart of decision and policymaking has been a central tenet of my published works, 
driving for transparency and coherence and contributing to the overall ‘professionalisation’ of policing.  And 
while it is never easy to measure accurately how one’s work might have been received, let alone applied, 
the combined effect of my published work has been directly related to advancements at the 
taxonomological levels of knowledge, understanding, skills and behaviours (Bloom 1956) within the 
relevant data law, governance and ultimately accountability of the police in England and Wales – and 
sometimes beyond.  This, I suggest, goes beyond mere knowledge articulation and is evidence of an original 
independent contribution to knowledge in the advancement of police law and effectiveness.  
 
The specific knowledge contribution flowing from my research is to be found in the identification of the 
dilemma and the synthesis of diverse legal principles, extracts of statutory and common law and other 
relevant legal literature into a collection of readily identifiable and applicable principles for LEAs to use in 
addressing it.  By bringing that compendium of legal principles to bear upon the very specific challenges and 
topical considerations identified within my publications I have created a repository of legal argument and 
authority to which LEAs must turn their minds if they are to address the dilemma of my research theme and 
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legitimately exploit the opportunities to increase their capabilities created by the digitization of their 
communities. Taking the form of statutes, codes of practice, legal instruments and case decisions from the 
criminal law, the rules of evidence and procedure, the international framework for the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, the specific legislative response to the proliferation of data capabilities 
such as privacy, social media and citizen journalism, along with the different approaches of domestic and 
international courts in different jurisdictions, the body of work is an original synthesis that directly 
addresses and extends, cogently and coherently, the legal knowledge requirement both for police 
officers/staff as individuals and for LEAs as accountable public entities, improving their respective abilities 
to act with legitimacy and to meet the burgeoning expectations of their communities. That is the leitmotif 
clearly evident within my work’s progression through linked, themed case studies; its coda is in the formal 
framework for LEAs in the ATHENA project and the content of the LEA data management ‘app’ designed 
for, and accepted by Europol in May 2020 for practical adoption across all Member States, and finally in the 
inclusion of the research theme directly within the international accountability tool published by the 
Scottish Universities Insight Institute.  These three tangible examples provide clear evidence of my original 




Following the terrorist attack on the Palace of Westminster in March 2017 the Metropolitan Police Service 
requested all LEAs in the UK to review and report back on how they capture, store, process and analyse 
social and citizen-sourced media data from major incidents.  This request was a stark recognition that these 
new informatics, this hugely powerful and expanding source of intelligence, potential evidence and mass 
communication capability was becoming routinely harnessed to prevent and investigate crime, to plot 
criminal activity and prosecute offenders, and to communicate with communities – virtual and geographical 
– in times of civil crisis.  The subsequent proliferation of citizen-created datasets during the COVID-19 
pandemic generally, and those shared on social media platforms by US citizens as potential evidence to be 
used in prosecutions of police shooting cases that occurred during May/June 2020 in particular, validate the 
importance of my research theme and underscore the continuing dilemma that faces LEAs in this regard.  If 
it is to be of positive value to LEAs and their communities, the product of these data grabs by LEAs and 
citizens must be demonstrably compliant with the legal framework protecting citizens and their data and 
balanced against the respective expectations of citizens and LEAs who are being driven inexorably to relying 
upon data sets created and shared with extraordinary speed.  My published work thus demonstrates 
contemporaneity with the emergence of new digital police/citizen relationships while my research and 
publication contribute both new thinking about, and practical solutions to this critically developing area for 
LEA actors.   Operating at the three levels of influence on knowledge management (Holsapple & Joshi) to 
bring about change through the publication of the work I have set out the planned organisational change 
being sought, created the setting for that change and studied in part its impact simultaneously.  All of the 
published work formed part of a national knowledge-sharing workshop in early 2019 coordinated by the 
Cabinet Office Emergency Planning College and Sheffield Hallam University (CENTRIC) attended by senior 
officers from policing, counter terrorism and intelligence portfolios along with local authorities and 
representatives from the new – and wonderfully acronymed - Yorkshire Office for Data Analytics (YODA).   
 
Having recognised and identified the peculiar legal challenges for, risks to and requirements of LEAs from a 
range of professional vantage points, I have interrogated the legal literature and existing regulation, 
capturing experiences, collating data and testing hypotheses.  I have applied and published the results 
contemporaneously with a series of live cases, culminating in a substantial contribution to knowledge 
within the parameters of an EU-wide research programme. The prescriptions I offered for policy and 
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practice are now embodied in the ATHENA prototype, an acutely practical framework for LEAs and 
emergency services which subsequently influenced the roll out of a yet more ambitious international 
project led by the University: the Security Communications & Analysis Network (SCAAN) designed and 
developed by one of the ATHENA partners - the UN IOM – to provide a digital platform providing 
communication and enhancing situational awareness during crises in the field.  They are also formally 
incorporated in the Principles for Accountable Policing, an international policy framework, the Explanatory 
Guide for which I wrote in July 2019.  Having been funded and published by the Scottish Universities Insight 
Institute, and developed over three years, the Principles are intended to be adopted by LEAs and the public 
across, not only the UK and Ireland, but also any jurisdiction in which the police purport to be 
democratically accountable.  The Principles have already been requested by a US police department 
following the civil unrest during the spring of 2020.  Finally I have specifically and directly applied my 
research findings within a CENTRIC project commissioned on behalf of Europol in the production of the 
‘app’, analysing in detail the relevant legislative framework and case authorities from my research to 
ensure LEAs understand and apply data processing legislation and case decisions when balancing the 
technologically possible with the legally permissible.   That product is, at the time of writing, in beta-testing 
phase and is likely to be formally adopted by Europol shortly. 
 
Were I to begin the research anew I would limit the focus primarily to the context of civil contingencies as 
provided for within the Strategic Policing Requirement (see s.37A Police Act 1996).  This is principally in 
light of the scale and impact of what was to follow in the form of the Covid-19 pandemic and its relevance 
to and amplification of the areas in my critical research question.  During the pandemic I was invited by 
Professor Hamid Jahankhani at Northumbria University to contribute a chapter identifying the legal and 
ethical data issues arising from the pandemic to a book that will be published by Springer at the end of this 
year.  Researching and compiling this has reinforced the conclusions within my research while the 
exigencies of the pandemic have underscored the attendant dilemma for LEAs.    
 
In sum, I have addressed the research question of how LEAs must balance the opportunities from 
burgeoning availability of data with the rapidly increasing public expectations of privacy, security, 
confidentiality and accountability, collecting and connecting the qualitative knowledge and practice that 
resides in distributed places and people, disciplines and databases in order to establish a previously 
unrecognised body of work that focuses on both opportunities and obligations, in order to promote an 
understanding of the applicable ‘law in context’ and ultimately increase police effectiveness.  The direction 
of my published work follows a series of not only influences, but also confluences, tributaries and deltas of 
change all flowing towards the same unequivocal destination: an original contribution to “knowledge about 
the traditional elements of the law and also about the quickly changing societal, political, economic and 













Note regarding co-authored works and research carried out in collaboration with others    
 
1. Fiona Kinnear was one of my research team working at the Police Authority when I arrived in 2008,  
responsible for maintaining the local crime mapping database and I encouraged her to begin to collate and  
publicise the details of the methodological approach being pioneered in West Yorkshire. She validated the  
technical accuracy of the article and provided the graphic; the remainder of the published work and the  
research on which it is based are my own.  
 
8. Alison Lyle is a former colleague from CENTRIC who previously worked with me on European  
Commission funded projects in the West Yorkshire Police.  The principal concept and message running 
through the chapter are my own, as are the practical policing elements and case law.  Alison as one of 
the leads on the Project ATHENA team provided the data protection analysis and factual information 
from the project.   
 
11. As part of the Steering Group I worked with the Scottish Universities Insight Institute to research the  
Principles.  I was then tasked with researching and writing the Explanatory Guide which is entirely my own  
































Analysis of the Publications, their Contribution and Synthesis as a Coherent Body of Work 
 
1. “Plotting Crimes: Too True to be Good? The rationale and risks behind crime mapping in the UK.”  
 
This preparatory work - diagnosing and action planning for the remainder of the published materials - 
began shortly after I was appointed as Chief Executive of the West Yorkshire Police Authority in 2008 when 
I worked on an emerging innovative criminological concept involving the tensions and competing legal 
considerations attending the compilation and accessibility of LEA datasets: that of crime mapping. 
 
While community policing was firmly embedded in every police force in England & Wales, a model in which 
the participation of the citizen is a central tenet, the key data relating to types, times and locations of 
volume crime were being expressly withheld by the police from the very communities being exhorted to 
help tackle it.  I was able to interview key policy leads such as Louise Casey, Home Office officials and 
researchers in specific police forces both domestically and in the US and, in so doing, identify the scale of 
the emergence of what was then a relatively narrow ‘data dilemma’ recognised by Heather Brooke: that of 
accurate and meaningful crime mapping.  The principal reason given by the police for withholding these 
data from external examination was, paradoxically, their accuracy: specificity and reliability were equated 
with ‘dangerousness’ and even illegality.  Building on the local ambitions of the Authority at that time I 
researched the data requirements and sentiments of our communities and then reviewed the realities of 
the legal framework within which any data sharing and analysis would take place.  Researching work carried 
out in the US and Canada, and interviewing the lead US researcher around civic data access, analysing the 
risks of making meaningful crime datasets publicly available, I held meetings and discussions with LEA 
personnel, the Home Office, police technology and training organisations and local politicians.  The 
postulated legal risks of withholding data and the failure to see how future expectations of citizens would 
become increasingly important to policing capability showed a lack of understanding by LEAs and 
represented a significant gap in knowledge.  Both the legal framework and the dependency on citizen-
created data (each of them being a key feature in the identified dilemma at the heart of my research) 
subsequently evolved significantly over the period of publication.   
 
The fundamental challenge for LEAs at the point of publication was how to enhance their community 
policing capability in the digital age in a way that was legally compliant, met the expectations of our 
communities and remained consonant with wider police accountability. At the time of publication, only 
West Yorkshire Police Authority was publishing crime data to street/address level using ‘dots-on-maps’ as 
opposed to the generalised ‘painting-by-numbers’ choropleth model.  In order to bring an innovative 
approach to the pooling of data and analytics emboldened by a better understanding of the digital zeitgeist, 
I published this article with the intention of increasing knowledge and understanding within the LEA 
community, setting out the issues in the context of the pioneering work that we were undertaking in West 
Yorkshire and contrasting the approach with that of the Civic Data Movement in the USA.  I include the 
article here partly because it marks the starting point for my programme of work to alert the law 
enforcement community to the bigger dilemma arising from the developing data interface between them 
and their citizens, the differential purposes for data collation and deployment and most of all because, as a 
result of this work it became clear to me that, not only was there a growing demand for public access to 
crime data and a legitimate expectation that it would be provided by LEAs, but also that LEAs would 
increasingly come to depend on citizens’ data captured on their own personal devices. The shift from a 
societal context in which citizens were vying to access the metadata sets of their LEAs to the endpoint 
where the emergence of social media and technological commoditisation has resulted in the creation of 
digital relationships between the LEAs and the citizen within which the police are increasingly dependent 
	 18	
upon the metadata sets of the citizen became a central feature of my research theme and sits at the centre 
of my final piece of work within the ATHENA project.  The specific legal considerations connecting the two 
pieces of work represent, not only a new area of rapidly developing law for LEAs, but one to which my 
published work has made an original contribution. 
 
 
2. “Cyberspace: the new frontier for policing? 
 
In the first training chapter of its kind to introduce LEA officers to the new technical realities of their 
digitized communities I examine two critical legal aspects of capability – scale and shape of challenge - in 
the specific context of cyber and cyber-enabled crime.  At the time of publication of the UK’s 2011 Cyber 
Security Strategy, an estimated 2 billion people were ‘online’ with over 5 billion Internet-connected devices 
in existence.  The response of LEAs in terms of the number of people being proceeded against in England 
and Wales for offences under the single specific piece of legislation (by then already over 20 years old) – 
the Computer Misuse Act 1990 - was just nine with no people at all being proceeded against for the two 
principal offences under s.1 (1) and s.1 (3).  My research of records from the Police National Legal Database 
(PNLD) shows that, during two weeks (chosen at random) in 2013, officers across England and Wales 
accessed the text of the legislation and its accompanying guidance notes 907 times in one week and 750 
times in another illustrating both an asymmetry in the scale of response to threat and an anomaly in the 
demand for legal knowledge and guidance.  
 
Against this background I introduced the ‘shape’ of the digital challenge for LEAs, demonstrating how 
fundamental, taken-for-granted concepts of investigation need to be reconsidered in light of technological 
possibility and public expectation.  Researching familiar, established concepts from standard criminal 
investigations (mens rea, actus reus, scene, suspect, etc.) I realised that even the most basic tenets of 
criminal investigation would need to be revisited by practitioners in the context of cyber and cyber-enabled 
criminality.  Using the concept of jurisdiction and an established set of legal criteria (Cottim 2010) I set out 
to demonstrate how the existing theories and approaches of the courts could not necessarily be relied 
upon in the digital context.  By working with senior policy leads in this area, analysing the statistical data 
from local and national LEA sources and assessing the knowledge, resources and ideas deployed within this 
developing area of policing, I put forward these propositions, testing them out at an international workshop 
of LEAs and research partners in Montpellier, France in 2015.  Having interviewed visiting Advisory Board 
members from CENTRIC, along with the most senior police officer in the US and a former US Attorney-
General, I researched the case authorities emanating from the United States to investigate the jurisdictional 
aspect, citing some (e.g. United States of America v. Jay Cohen; Docket No. 00-1574, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir., 
July 31, 2001); Bavaria v Felix Somm (unreported)) to illustrate a new approach within an appropriate 
format for LEAs, before going on to review UK case law and selecting some standing authorities that might 
no longer hold good in the new digital age of citizens’ data and cyber offending (e.g. Klemis v Government 
of the United States of America [2013] All ER (D) 287; Bloy and Another v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2013] 
EWCA Civ 1543).  
 
In terms of impact, this work is now used within the curriculum for specialist investigator training in LEAs in 
England and Wales and the areas of learning captured are also part of organisational learning within LEAs 
(the link between the two being a key feature of strategic knowledge management – Klein 1998).  I go on to 
diagnose the nature, size, shape and scale of the challenge represented by cyber space within the context 
of the UK Cyber Security Strategy and the subsequent developments among public bodies to adapt 
accordingly.  I conclude by raising the growing dilemma presented by the need to balance security of 
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citizens against the regulated conduct of state agencies in respect of their citizens’ data (a central part of 
my research theme that runs through the publications that follow, to the final publications in which that 
dilemma is borne out within an EU funded research project in which the University was a key partner).  This 
book is now a staple of cyber investigation training for LEAs both in the UK and internationally. 
 
3. “The Legal Challenges of Big Data Application in Law Enforcement.” 
 
“With so much data so readily available, on what basis would law enforcement agencies (LEAs) not seize it 
and run with it as far and as fast as possible, if doing so meant preventing terrorist attacks, disrupting 
serious organized crime, or preventing wide-scale child sexual exploitation, human trafficking, and so 
forth?”  
 
This question was put to me during the course of my research for the previous article by an interviewee and 
I adopted it here as a rhetorical question against which to continue the research theme into the next piece 
of work.  My posited answer to the question sets out the peculiar legal issues arising from the increased Big 
Data capabilities by LEAs and what I saw as their new relationship with the citizen.  Setting out the 
overarching legal framework from the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Council of Europe Treaties 108 (01/1981) I introduce LEA 
practitioners to the legal issues arising from Big Data and then, by way of a further new contribution to the 
discussion, illustrate how the extraordinary capability of Big Data to identify general trends and macro-
correlations can also be used directly to affect the individual, a feature which, I demonstrate, has specific 
implications for LEAs.  Taking the research theme further I consider the technical legal framework 
components such as the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 governing the retention and destruction of 
fingerprints, footwear impressions, and DNA samples taken in the course of a criminal investigation; the 
further regulation of closed circuit television, automatic number plate recognition, and other surveillance 
camera technology operated by the police and local authorities; the need for judicial approval before local 
authorities can use certain data-gathering techniques; data provision with respect to parking enforcement 
and counter-terrorism powers, the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the jurisprudence 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ).  Within the work I then introduce another novel 
argument: that the indiscriminate—or at least non-discriminating—nature of Big Data analytics and the 
automation of data processing (a sine qua non of Big Data’s principal value) extends the research theme 
dilemma for LEAs because the greater the automation, the less scope there is for intervention by the 
controlling mind and the application of discretion, both critical considerations when demonstrating 
proportionate interference with the rights of the citizen which will always be subject to review by the Court 
(per Coster v. United Kingdom, 2001; 33 EHRR 479).  Continuing the research theme I examine the human 
rights considerations and expand upon the challenges brought by the key legal concept of ‘purpose 
limitation’ and ‘further processing’, exploring the correlative need to address societal acceptability and 
issues of trust, confidence and legitimacy of the police, collating the seminal case law and legal actions 
against LEAs.  For example, in terms of the former, S & Marper v. United Kingdom (2008) ECHR 1581 (a case 
arising at the time of the Crime Mapping evolution which held that the retention of DNA samples of 
individuals arrested but later acquitted or having the charges against them dropped was a violation of right 
to privacy); R (on the application of GC & C) v. The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2011) UKSC 21 
(successful challenge of policy allowing indefinite retention of biometric samples); The Queen (on the 
application of Catt) v. The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland and 
The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (2013) EWCA Civ 192 (police monitoring of public protests).  
In terms of the latter my research into parliamentary and regulatory publications reveals stark and cogent 
criticism of the police handling of datasets (Report of the Public Administration Select Committee 13th 
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session 2013/14 HC 760, HMIC reports) which, as part of the research theme’s dilemma have to be 
balanced with e.g. findings of the Bichard Inquiry in which I was instructed as a solicitor by the Police 
Federation of England & Wales.  The work illustrates how the technical complexities of even the European 
Union’s own legislative framework were unable to keep pace with the technological changes in law 
enforcement activity and I end the work with a specific consideration of how far generic Big Data practices 
such as “do not track” and “do not collect” are applicable in an LEA relationship with the citizen, concluding 
that the resolution of this strand of the research theme dilemma for LEAs (and, by extension, for the 
relationships of their partners in key areas such as safeguarding, fraud prevention, and the proper 
establishment of the rule of law in cyberspace)—will be as much a technical challenge for the law itself as 
for the data technology.  
 
4. “Whatever You Say ...”:The Case of the Boston College Tapes and How Confidentiality Agreements 
Cannot Put Relevant Data Beyond the Reach of Criminal Investigation in Policing.” 
 
In this journal article I take the ‘legitimate purpose’ theme further and introduce a situation whereby LEAs 
seek to compel the disclosure of private digital material produced for one legitimate non-investigatory 
purpose (academic research) for use in their legitimate investigation of crime and as evidence in the 
prosecution of offenders.  This followed my interviews with investigators who wanted to understand the 
legal framework and principles of compellability further.  My subsequent research of the legal interface 
between LEAs, the state and social media service providers in order to compel disclosure of data that may 
amount to evidence in a criminal investigation was highly topical, touching as it did upon the so-called 
crypto wars and wider data privacy disputes in the United States which engaged many of the accountability 
issues I had explored in the previous material.  Having interviewed colleagues from LEAs and an academic 
researcher from the Republic of Ireland I researched a live dispute between the Police Service for Northern 
Ireland, an academic body in the US and the individual rights and interests of a private citizen and took it as 
a case study for further investigation.  In the subsequent article I begin by adapting an established common 
law authority that sets out the challenge of proportionate intrusiveness facing police officers (R v. Lewes 
Crown Court ex parte Hill (1991) 93 Cr App R 60) in an ‘analogue’ context and extend/apply the principles to 
the arguments that were being contested in the Boston College Tapes case in which privately-processed 
datasets owned by an academic institution were being sought by detectives in a terrorism investigation into 
an undetected murder.   
 
By reference to the approaches of the courts against the LEA in several jurisdictions  (e.g. Re: Request from 
the UK Pursuant to the Treaty Between the Government of the USA and the Government of the UK on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters in the Matter of Dolours Price M.B.D. No. 11-MC-91078 US district 
court district of Massachusetts; Rea’s (Winston Churchill) Application [2015] NICA 8) and by illustrating the 
engagement with the previously-discussed issues under the ECHR and associated case law (e.g. Amann v. 
Switzerland (2000) 30 EHRR 843;  R (OTAO Hafner and Another) v. City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court 
[2009] 1 WLR 1005), I illustrate the novel ways in which the LEAs and their respective governments were 
calling upon international law to challenge the local court rulings over data privacy considerations at the 
heart of my research theme, along with the equally novel grounds of resistance by private 
bodies/individuals.   
 
Highlighting one of the further elements from the research theme - the public expectations of our LEAs (in 
this case to investigate murder and bring suspected offenders to justice) – I use the Boston College case to 
explore the competing legal and societal issues from my research theme and to show how the fundamental 
obligations of the police have ultimately prevailed in attempts to use public, private and international law 
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principles to put the data set beyond the reach of criminal investigation.   I also introduce the novel 
argument of asserting journalistic material protection, an argument that was not pleaded by the 
respondents in these cases but which was deployable and which might be prayed in aid in future challenges 
to LEAs as they try to tap	into	the	 ‘collective	problem	solving’	of	citizens	and	their	data	 (Palen (2008); 
Palen et al. (2009) proposing that there remains an overriding presumption in favour of the operational 
requirements of the relevant LEA investigation, a presumption that cannot be rebutted or qualified by 
individual consensus or even perhaps inter-State agreements under International Law.  The importance of 
this tension between operational imperatives and privacy for data processors arises later in items 6 and 7 in 
relation to the reluctance of the citizen to share their datasets with LEAs even in the rarefied and neutral 
context of a research programme.   
 
 
5. “Intelligent evidence: Using open source intelligence (OSINT) in criminal proceedings.” 
 
6. “Following the Breadcrumbs: Using Open Source Intelligence as Evidence in Criminal Proceedings”  
 
Through these publications I specifically progress and expand the element of the research theme that I had 
identified early on in my research.  Moving from consideration of how LEAs might lawfully access and 
deploy data sets acquired by third parties for non-LEA purposes I consider the reverse situation which I 
proposed would assume greater significance for LEAs in the future, asking how the reverse might be 
addressed.  In these works I look at the dilemma from the citizens’ perspective by examining how far LEAs 
are coming to terms with the potency of social media and Internet-based communication as a 
phenomenological intelligence source, one feature of which I identify as the narrowing of ‘traditional’ 
boundaries between information directing lines of investigation (intelligence) and material connecting a 
chain of proof relied upon in criminal proceedings (evidence).  In both publications I address a further 
strand within the research theme dilemma, that of social media and other open source material becoming 
freely available to the police in everyday policing matters and emanating from their new ‘digital 
relationship’ with the citizen.  I use the journal article and a subsequent LEA textbook chapter to follow this 
central feature of my research theme into two elemental areas for LEAs: criminal intelligence and criminal 
evidence.  Taking the proliferation in social media and Open Source Intelligence (‘OSINT’) in the first article, 
I consider the impact in a literature review and, as in previous articles, take an established definition for the 
digital sector (from Kaplan and Haenlein 2010) before applying it by revisiting the long-established legal 
principles for criminal evidence.  For example I consider some carefully chosen key concepts such as 
admissibility, relevance to a fact in issue (DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729; R v Blastland [1986] AC 41), 
weight and purpose, considering them all in the digital context of Twitter and other social media platforms 
– thereby illustrating the need to balance the first and second aspects of the research theme dilemma 
(possible vs permissible).  I go on to extend this discussion by applying the established legal principles and 
the relevant legislation to a hypothetical case that I construct from research of the case law and statutory 
analysis.  I create a fact pattern in order to lead the LEA reader to consider the relevant issues from my 
research theme, providing a detailed legal analysis of those issues in light of selected case authorities (e.g. 
Bucknor v R [2010] EWCA Crim 1152; T v R [2012] EWCA Crim 2358 ).   
 
In terms of practical contribution to knowledge, I offer a list of new ‘self-check questions’ that I adapt from 
the CPS Guidelines on hearsay, suggesting that they be applied by LEA actors when considering all the legal 
issues highlighted in the article before going on to consider a second, more complex hypothetical case the 
fact pattern of which was produced by my further research of case law and statutory references in order to 
illustrate the ideas proposed.  I produce a review of the relevant case law around the exclusion of 
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unlawfully or unfairly obtained materials in criminal trials and in particular consider the consequences for 
LEAs of failure to adhere to the legal requirements and the perils of being tempted into trickery using social 
media to catch suspects, once again extending and furthering the central research theme dilemma of how 
LEAs will have to balance the technically possible with the legally permissible. 
 
Directly addressing the research theme I conclude that “in a world that relies so unquestioningly on 
information gathered from open sources it is all too easy to assume that such information will be accepted 
in every setting, including formal legal proceedings” and demonstrate how failure by LEAs to consider the 
issues elaborated upon may prove fatal to a prosecution or related proceedings. Finally I return to the novel 
legal concept arising from social media researchers treatment of some OSINT material as ‘citizen 
journalism’ and how such material might attract the statutory protection (see the Police & Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, ss. 11 and 13) accorded to sensitive materials and presenting LEAs with a further 
challenge within the dilemma of the research theme.  
 
The second publication was researched and produced specifically for a textbook written for all LEA actors in 
EU member states. In it I develop the elements of the research theme from the conjoined journal article by 
examining more closely the considerable power of social media to provide an extension of LEA capability in 
respect of intelligence through the jurisprudential lens of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).  Considering and analysing once again the purposive element of the applicable legal framework I 
examine the differences between community policing intelligence (wide ranging, almost undefined, and 
covering an array of activities from supplying information on which to base an arrest e.g. by giving rise to 
reasonable suspicion to the likely destination of a vulnerable person who has gone missing) and the 
evidential purposes within an investigation.  I look at developments in socio-digital behaviour among 
citizens and propose a novel concept: that these have produced a new category of ‘community’ which can 
be seen as a virtual group created by coalescence around a particular theme or event.  Such groups are 
evanescent in nature and probably unique in identity and, once the event/activity/interest that unites the 
members of the community diminishes, so does the digital community itself.  This is a significant new 
concept for LEAs and one that directly engages considerations at the heart of the research theme.  While 
the availability of data both from and about these digital communities creates a new potential capability for 
LEAs (the ‘possible’) - some of whom are increasingly inviting their citizenry to contribute digital material in 
the investigation crime (for example by ‘dashcam’ recordings) - the legal implications of LEAs accessing and 
relying on the datasets are of central importance to police effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability (the 
‘permissible’ and ‘acceptable’).  I consider in detail the extent and impact of the ECHR and of Art 6(1) (right 
to a fair criminal hearing) in particular, for all LEAs operating within EU jurisdictions.  Once again I further 
the knowledge required by LEAs in order to be effective within the context of the research theme, 
providing an examination of the case law and encouraging LEA actors to consider these issues anew within 
their recently-enabled digital capabilities – for example the impact in new ‘OSINT’ circumstances of 
standing authorities on disclosure to defendants in criminal proceedings (Rowe and Davis v. the United 
Kingdom (2000) ECHR 91) and raising novel questions of how these will affect the entitlement to “facilities” 
that a defendant must enjoy when preparing his/her defence (Huseyn and Others v. Azerbaijan (application 
nos. 35485/05, 45553/05, 35680/05 and 36085/05); OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia (2014) 
ECHR 906.) or the opportunity to acquaint him or herself with the results of investigations carried out 
throughout the proceedings Mayzit v. Russia application no. 42502/06; Moiseyev v. Russia (2011) 53 EHRR 
9).  
 
I go on to demonstrate by reference to worked examples how, if digital or social media-obtained LEA 
intelligence is to be relied upon evidentially anywhere within the EU, it will need to meet the same forensic 
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standards and clear the same legal hurdles as any other form of evidence, thereby continuing the research 
theme in relation to technical possibility vs legal permissibility.  My contribution to ‘new knowledge’ here is 
in the diagnosing of gaps between the expository, doctrinal research and the contextual realities of the LEA 
environment, increasing knowledge and understanding that flow from its posited answer: that the 
application of informatics within a law enforcement setting is qualitatively different from that of Big Data 
application in most non-LEA settings.  I go on to explicate those reasons, found within the complex and 
dynamic legal framework for data protection and regulation across the European Community (black letter 
law) setting out the synchronic legal position against a diachronic review of the cases and events charting 
an unedifying history of LEAs’ treatment of personal data.  The chapter appears in Application of Big Data 
for National Security (Elsevier) which “provides users with state-of-the-art concepts, methods, and 
technologies for Big Data analytics in the fight against terrorism and crime, including a wide range of case 
studies and application scenarios”.   Opening the section specifically aimed at the legal and social 
challenges of Big Data I balance the central dilemma against the further perennial risk for LEAs of 
community condemnation for failing to use all ‘available’ data to prevent loss of life or to detect serious 
crime, illustrating how and why this makes law enforcement a peculiarly perilous context for Big Data 
application.   
 
By combining the existing legal knowledge in the form of established laws of evidence and applying them 
within a wholly new and developing context of digitized citizen-generated and owned data sets, I make an 
original contribution to the professional knowledge of LEAs while, at the same time, adopting a simple 
established learning technique of taking the already ‘known’ and applying it to a new concept to introduce 
and improve understanding of the latter (Bransford et al 2000).  Some of the specific risks picked up in this 
chapter were subsequently addressed directly by EU and domestic legislation while the wider principles 
and competing pressures remain.  In terms of impact, the book is already becoming a standard text for LEAs 
nationally and internationally.  Insofar as further and continuing impact is concerned, I went on to apply the 
research directly within a project undertaken by CENTRIC on behalf of Europol in the production of an ‘app’ 
to support LEA actors in understanding and managing data processing law and the specific provisions that 
they must take into account when balancing that which is technologically possible with the legally 
permissible.  The ‘app’ was formally accepted by Europol in May 2020.   
 
In the next two overlapping pieces I bring together the issues explored in the preceding works.  
 
 
7. “The ATHENA Equation – Balancing the Efficacy of Citizens’ Response to Emergency with the Reality of 
Citizens’ Rights.”  
 
8. “Legal Considerations Relating to the Police Use of Social Media” (with Lyle, A). 
 
Led by the LEA team that I established in West Yorkshire Police, Project ATHENA was a meta-project funded 
by European Commission H2020 grant involving, in addition to the University, the UN International 
Organisation for Migration, public authorities from Hungary, Turkey and Slovenia, the Supreme Court of 
Latvia, the University of Virginia (Critical Incident Analysis Group) and Harvard Medical School. Taking place 
over 3 years ATHENA set out to develop ‘apps’ for smart phones and mobile digital devices to capture real-
time information from citizens during crisis situations and, as such, directly engaged my research theme.  
My specific contribution was formally published under the requirements of the Work Package in which I 
demonstrated how, at the very heart of the project’s output, there lay the same issues elucidated in my 
research theme and developed throughout the preceding articles, issues of citizens' legitimate expectations 
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and entitlements, duties and responsibilities of emergency responders, complicated by abstruse and as yet 
unformed causes of action, restrictions, private and public data interests, possibilities and opportunities all 
arising within a complex and developing inter-jurisdictional legal framework engaging issues of informed 
consent, licensed ownership and overriding public and political interests. My bringing together these issues 
was elemental to the Project’s efficacy (and that of any similar project) and the tangible product I 
contributed was a new praxis for emergency responders to adopt when using citizens’ data within any EU 
LEA (which was subsequently used in a further ambitious research programme). 
 
Taking the law at the time of writing and applying it to the specific societal contexts of ATHENA, my original 
contribution in these two linked publications was to bring together the many principles and legal 
considerations identified and analysed in the foregoing publications, with item 7 setting out the initial legal 
elements for LEAs in an article produced for policing decision makers, with item 8 forming the broader in-
depth analysis for the relevant chapter in the full write-up under the rigorous terms of the EU project grant. 
 
The goal of the ATHENA project was to deliver two major outputs enabling and encouraging users of ‘new 
media’ to contribute to the security of citizens in crisis situations.  Based on the LEA learning from the 
terrorist attack on the Taj hotel, Mumbai in 2008, Project ATHENA proposed to achieve the outputs by 
designing a set of best practice guidelines for both LEAs and citizens to increase their joint capability by 
using new media and applying them lawfully, proportionately and accountably towards a common end: 
safety and security.  The specific tensions and issues within my research theme were designed into the 
project and, in exploring how LEAs and other crisis responders might harness new communications media 
(particularly web-based social media such as Twitter and Facebook) and the prolific use of high-tech mobile 
devices to provide efficient and effective communication and enhanced situational awareness during a 
crisis, ATHENA was aimed directly at the research theme’s focus, addressing the dilemma at the developing 
interface between Big Data, LEA capability and the citizen.   
 
The ‘narrow’ contribution made by the two publications lies in my diagnosis of the novel competing legal 
considerations in a complex operational setting, followed by the action planning, implementation, 
evaluation and specification of the subsequent learning for the LEAs involved and those that follow.  I begin 
by bringing together the components of the legal framework for the general protection, processing, sharing 
and retention of data in the UK and identifying how, for LEAs, this area is heavily regulated by a mixture of 
European and domestic law, some of which creates particular challenges and dilemmas for LEAs (as 
summarised at the time by the Supreme Court in the context of data access and journalism in Kennedy v 
The Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20).  Returning to the critical legal concept of purpose limitation and 
exploring the overarching legal framework for data processing in EU-wide jurisdictions, I apply the 
established jurisprudential principles to what I continue to identify as a novel concept of ‘digital 
relationships’.  In the setting of this major research project I examine how the proposed actions of the LEAs 
under the project will result in the creation, de facto and de jure, of digital relationships between citizens 
and the State.  I then critically examine how the relevant legal instruments (e.g. Article 8 ECHR prohibiting 
interference with the right to privacy except where such interference is in accordance with the generally 
applicable departures from the Convention article necessary in a democratic society); Article 6(1)(b) of 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24.10.1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 
281, 23.11.1995, 31) and the attendant case law (e.g. Gillan and Quinton v The United Kingdom (no 
4158/05/2010)) might apply.  Published contemporaneously with a period of intense international political, 
legislative and judicial activity around data protection and processing (see for example the judgment in 
Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others and the subsequent 
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legislation) this work - and the subsequent chapter published in order to promulgate the learning from 
Project ATHENA - highlights acutely the dilemma of possibility vs permissibility for LEAs.  I also extend the 
argument around the anticipated assertion of a the status of ‘journalistic material’ as protected by the 
courts (R (on the application of British Sky Broadcasting Ltd.) v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
[2014] UKSC 17 to a new, expanded class of material incorporating citizen data.  
 
 
My introduction of the concept of ‘digital relationships’ between the LEAs and their participating citizens 
represents a further original contribution to knowledge and I go on to identify how – following the 
arguments and issues from the previous publications - the legal issues arising within the relationships 
created at the interface between the data elements, the LEAs and the citizen required an extension to the 
project’s ‘best practice guidelines’ (first article) and then expound further on the wider issues and risks 
arising within the ATHENA exploitation phase touching on LEAs’ use of social media generally.  While the 
original project brief for ATHENA included some mandatory legal and ethical principles (put forward by 
another ATHENA researcher, Alison Lyle of CENTRIC), I argued in the settings of workshops and programme 
reviews that there were fundamental legal considerations beyond those originally identified.  I therefore 
proposed a governing legal protocol between ATHENA subscribers (citizens) and those LEAs (and other 
State agencies) that will ultimately be collecting, sharing, processing and retaining their data.  In this way 
the triptych of informatics, intelligence and innovation came together, in a highly practical, multi-
jurisdictional research project creating new understanding and capability in the legal and accountable 
digital frontiers for law enforcement.  The specific contribution to knowledge and learning from the 
consolidating publication is set out in the form of a series of recommended ‘rules of engagement’ both for 
the Project and the wider activity for LEAs.  The subsequent 12 rules all draw on the principles in the 
foregoing publications; all are concerned with Hermitage’s (op cit) police ‘knowledge requirement’ and the 
legal framework I have established, identified and followed throughout; all are part of an original 
contribution to knowledge.  That contribution is finalised in the second piece of work which rounds off, not 
only my own research work, but also the research findings of the ATHENA project itself.  Taking the form of 
a technical manual that sits within a wider series of international authoritative texts in transactions in 
computational science and computational intelligence, my penultimate piece (co-authored with Lyle) brings 
together the overlapping elements from the ATHENA and OSINT work and synthesises all the previous 
publications.  Building on the work at item 7, the final chapter analyses previously discussed legal and 
societal elements of the ‘data dilemmas’ within the research theme, addressing the expectations of privacy 
by the ‘citizens’ in ATHENA and the extent of citizen mistrust of the State with their data even in the 
controlled circumstances of volunteers in a research project.  The chapter also considers other themes such 
as the recent recognition by the Police Foundation of ‘intelligence and evidence’ as a specific category of 
social media data deployment by LEAs, as well as going into greater depth on the legislative framework for 
data protection across the EU member states and the changes being introduced via the General Data 
Protection Regulation 2016.   
 
The relevance of ATHENA to my research question can be seen most clearly in the project’s feedback 
summarised in the book’s concluding remarks thus: “What is perhaps most notable of all about the 
feedback received … is that, whilst ‘members’ of the police and public alike were generally impressed by the 
technological and communicative prowess of the ATHENA system, there was evidence of some concern 
among the latter with regard to certain legal or ethical issues.  Respondents were evidently discomfited to 
learn that the app provided access to personal data, with some arguing that the ATHENA privacy policy 
needed to be far more explicit in saying that, by sending messages to the police, the individual was 
effectively surrendering their right to privacy. Similar feelings of alarm surrounded the fact that the police 
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might use information volunteered by the public as ‘evidence’ in the process of crime detection.” (Akhgar et 
al). 
 
This conclusion neatly synthesises the divergent tensions at the centre of my research theme that began 
many years earlier, underscoring the critical importance of LEAs being able to identify and address all the 
competing issues if they are legitimately and effectively to harness what is technologically possible and 
balance it with the legally permissible and societally acceptable in increasing their overall capability.  The 
contribution to new knowledge comes principally from combining the detailed expository legal research 
with that of the ‘law in context’ (the context here being the ATHENA case studies) and the legitimate 
expectations of the citizen, together with my proposal for LEAs to develop a form of End User Agreement 
License.  My contribution to the chapter addressed the application of the black letter law across a series of 
legal cases and constructs to the dilemma while Lyle had been on hand throughout the ATHENA workshops 
and focused primarily on the explication of the constitutional framework and the ethical challenges.  The 
ATHENA editors went on to observe: 
 
“The trick, as Lyle and Sampson rightly maintain, is to strike the right balance between respecting the 
personal privacy of the individual while doing as much as possible to guarantee the safety and security of 
the wider population. These authors quite reasonably insist that ATHENA and other SA platforms of this 
nature have a clear need to operate according to transparent sets of guidelines and protocols for the use of 
personal data, which should ideally incorporate an End User Agreement License. It is, they believe, only by 
resorting to such safeguarding mechanisms that the likes of ATHENA will be able to maintain the legitimacy 
and integrity it requires to guarantee the ideal levels of public consent and cooperation”.  
 
This endorsement of my research theme – and the explicit reference to transparency and legitimacy - 
reflects the overarching consideration in enhancing LEA capability by digital development, and the object of 
my final piece of work: accountability. 
 
 
9. The Principles for Accountable Policing 4 
 
In 2016, as a Fellow of the Scottish Institute for Policing Research (SIPR), I was invited to be a member of a 
programme team to research and draft a set of Principles for Accountable Policing.   Funded by the Scottish 
Universities Insight Institute the programme comprised two workshops bringing together practitioners 
from the police and oversight bodies across the UK, and academic experts to devise a set of principles  
“intended to be of practical use to the police and the various oversight bodies, as well as the public”5.  This 
programme gave me the opportunity to make an original contribution to the product in the form of direct 
incorporation of the research dilemma within the Principles themselves, making the considerations and 
findings a component part of the Principles themselves.  Within the preparatory scoping work, the 
workshops themselves and the post-workshop events, I jointly drafted the Principles; I then researched and 
wrote the Explanatory Guidance published in October 2019 which I submit as my final piece of work.  In 
terms of impact and contribution, the Principles were formally accepted by the Police Foundation shortly 
before the Covid19 restrictions and will be offered via the Foundation to all LEAs in democratic societies 
across the world.  In light of the civil unrest following the deaths of African Americans at the hands of the 
police, filmed by citizens and published contemporaneously as OSINT/evidence the Principles and the 
	
4	https://www.scottishinsight.ac.uk/Programmes/OpenCall201516/PrinciplesofAccountablePolicing.aspx	
5 loc cit 
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consonant elements of my published works have been proposed by the JAMS Foundation in California as 
the focus for an international law enforcement mediation project involving Senior Mediation Fellows in 
Pakistan, Nigeria, Croatia and the United States.   No formal reference is yet available for this document but 
Professor Nick Fyfe, Dean of the School of Social Sciences at the University of Dundee can testify to its 
provenance and the fact that it has recently been requested by the City of Seattle to help them redesign 
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Fraser Sampson L.L.B., L.L.M., M.B.A., Solicitor, is Chief Executive of the 
West Yorkshire Police Authority, and Fiona Kinnear B.Sc. (Hons) is 
Research Director at the Authority. Working closely with the West Yorkshire 
Police, the West Yorkshire Police Authority has been leading the way in 
crime mapping in England and Wales since 2005. Beatcrime, their award-
winning website, is unique in using dots-on-maps to show recorded crimes 
and trends down to street level and to make that information available to the 
public. While this approach has been recognized by bodies such as the 
National Policing Improvement Agency, the question of how much detail the 
public are entitled to expect from their criminal justice agencies and how 
much those agencies should withhold remains a contentious area in the UK. 
This article considers some of the competing arguments against the backdrop 
of increasing demands for public access to civic data.  
 
If knowledge is power, information is the natural energy source on which it 
depends. In the context of public information generally, and criminal justice 
in particular, that energy source appears to be in short supply. As the clamour 
for more information gains both global momentum and political attention, 
policing organizations across the UK are under pressure to make their crime 
data available to their communities. How this has come about and what 
strategic challenges it brings with it are the subject of this article.  
What follows is an analysis of the route by which crime mapping has taken 
hold within England and Wales, the key drivers behind its development and 




   The route to crime mapping in England and 
Wales  
  
The need to provide better public information on criminal justice matters has 
been recognized for some time within the UK and to that extent, the demand 
for maps illustrating where crimes have been committed is nothing new; 
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however, it is only in the last few years that the efforts to do so have come 
front and centre of policing policy, with the last 12 months having been 
particularly prominent. Now that the government has required all police 
forces to provide information around crime and criminality in their areas, the 
needs and benefits are becoming apparent; so too are some of the difficulties.  
In what was reported as being the first fully accessible and interactive system 
in England and Wales to provide the public with local, up-to-date crime 
information on a map,1 the West Yorkshire Police Authority launched a 
website called Beatcrime2 in 2005. Originally created by the Police 
Authority,3 the website is supported by the West Yorkshire Police with whose 
data the site is populated and its title reflects both the objective of tackling 
crime and the illustration of recorded offences by local area (historically 
known as ‘beats’). By entering a postal code and selecting a crime type, 
people were able to view for the first time the crime picture of their local area, 
either as dots marking the approximate location of crimes reported in the 
previous month (often on maps going down to street level) or as bar charts, 
comparing crime levels for each month with those for the previous year. Since 
its launch, the site has  
become established in the range of tools available both to the public and the 
Police Authority to hold the police to account. The site also raises the profile 
of the Police Authority and helps the public to associate it with the monitoring 
of police performance and crime and disorder reduction.4  
This award-winning website attracted over 40,000 hits in its first year—by 
January 2009, it received almost the same number in a month. Among many 
innovative features the Beatcrime website has, two are of particular interest in 
the sphere of public information provision. The first is that, as noted supra, it 
was the first website of its kind among UK police organizations; the second is 
that it was, and remains at the time of writing, the only crime mapping system 
to use ‘dots-on-maps’ when displaying crime statistics. It is the latter of these 
features that has attracted interest recently—and that has also given rise to 
some cautiousness on the part of other policing bodies in the UK.  
Before considering the implications of the various approaches to crime 
mapping by police forces in England and Wales, it is helpful to look at the 
backdrop against which these developments have taken place along with the 
developments relating to data access generally.  
 
 
    Civic data access  
  
Beyond pure crime statistics, there is clear evidence of a growing 
mobilization of public pressure for greater access to official data per se, and 
not only within the UK but on a global basis, to the extent that the provision 
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of accurate and timely civic data is becoming a central component of the 
democratic process.5  
Whether this truly world-wide phenomenon is born of greater concern for 
ensuring transparency and accountability in our public services or whether it 
is simply a discrete manifestation of an increasing but discerning appetite for 
what might be categorized as civic data access (CDA) is unclear. There are 
however many examples of what is almost a political movement with global 
ambitions towards accumulating and unmasking civic data to be found on 
many websites and search engines. Ranging from, for example, the Open 
Govt Data movement that claims to represent exponents of e-advocacy to the 
proponents of e-activism (such as DemocracyInAction.org) the presence, 
popularity and proliferation of these e-communities is illustrative of the public 
demand for more civic data.6  
Just what qualifies as ‘civic data’ is uncertain; but the following is offered as 
a useful working definition, based on the communications from these 
organizations:  
‘Civic data’ are those sets of information created and maintained by public 
organizations and paid for at the public's expense as part of the day-to-day 
activities of local or national government.  
As such civic data can include things as diverse as crime data, the number of 
street lamps on a stretch of road, the sentences handed down by particular 
courts or the allowances paid to public officials. Though it is not always clear 
from some of the material available, the CDA argument appears to be based 
on the proposition that—to the extent that raw information can attract 
proprietary rights—such data are owned by the public and therefore ought to 
be made available to the public. There is force in this argument. Even if the 
jurisdiction of the country concerned fails to recognize the ownership of raw 
information, there is no gainsaying the fact that the creation, classification and 
cataloguing of these data (i.e. all the activities that give it its inherent value) 
are funded by the taxpayer. Plainly, this is not the same as accepting that all 
such data collated by the State on our behalf must therefore necessarily be 
disclosed (in full or at all) to the general population—otherwise information 
affecting defence, civil nuclear programmes, and vulnerabilities in the critical 
national infrastructure, etc. would present a significant strategic risk. But 
perhaps in the case of civic data, there should be a general presumption in 
favour of public disclosure, a presumption that will only be rebutted by a 
substantial, evidenced and proportionate case such as a real threat to national 
security. In any event, the call for access to civic data is a real and growing 
phenomenon and forms the background against which the more specific crime 
mapping activities of policing organizations are taking place.  
 
 
    Crime mapping  
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It is within the broader context of this CDA Zeitgeist that police organizations 
have been coming under increasing pressure to divulge information about 
criminality in their area.  
While the West Yorkshire Police Authority launched its seminal website in 
2005, it was not until 2008 that crime mapping really took off in England and 
Wales. The reason was the coincidence of several key publications and events 
in the summer of that year that significantly raised the profile of crime maps, 
lending them the strategic lift and speed necessary to get the subject into the 
already crowded skies over UK policing governance. These events can thus 
be summarized as follows:  
1 On 3 May, the charismatic media personality and Member of 
Parliament, Boris Johnson, successfully challenged Ken Livingstone 
for the office of Mayor of London.7 As the Chairman of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority (a position accompanying his mayoral 
appointment), Mr Johnson became a keen advocate of crime mapping 
almost as soon as he took up the role8 and has continued to promote 
the principles of making such information available to the public ever 
since.  
2 On 18 June, Tony Blair's former advisor on anti-social behaviour, 
Louise Casey, reported her findings following her extensive research 
into public expectations of the criminal justice system at a 
neighbourhood level (Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime, 
2008). Ms Casey recommended that police forces should be required 
to publish monthly crime information and to include what action is 
being taken to tackle crime, contact telephone numbers, e-mail 
addresses and how to complain if dissatisfied.9  
3 On 17 July, the government published its Green Paper ‘From the 
neighbourhood to the national: policing our communities together’.10 
In this much-debated paper, the government set out its national 
proposals for the strategic reform of policing in England and Wales. 
Among the many themes and strands on which it drew, the paper 
identified the type of information that the public said they wanted 
from their police organizations and the role that policing organizations 
should play in providing it.  
In the Green Paper, the government also accepted the findings of a 
national research project the same year, showing that victims’ 
satisfaction correlates directly with the quality and responsiveness of 
their contact with the police and the information they receive.11  
4 And in December, the first national Policing Pledge was introduced 
as part of the government's wider agenda for policing reform. Taking 
the form of a national promise of service priority and delivery signed 
up by all 43 chief constables in England and Wales,12 the thinking 
behind the Pledge is supported by other broader research that shows 
how public confidence improves when the police deal with local 
priorities (Tuffin et al., 2006). Thus creating the Policing Pledge 
commits chief officers to a series of things ranging from response 
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times to call handling and also includes an undertaking to provide 
information and crime mapping as a specific clause.  
At the same time as these events occurred, the need for reliable, accessible 
and meaningful information on crime and the criminal justice system clearly 
evidenced within the key reports was robustly corroborated in an independent 
report by Giangrande et al. (2008). Relying on its extensive review of the 
evidence on the subject, the researchers concluded that  
Britons have become "passive bystanders", uninformed about crime and 
punishment and less likely to participate in maintaining justice than people in 
other countries.  
The report went on to highlight the importance of providing information thus:  
Poor information is the key barrier to the active engagement of society in 
lawfulness. On the one hand, individuals do not understand the true level of 
crime in their area, increasing fear of crime. On the other, individuals are 
unaware of the activities of the criminal justice system, increasing their 
disassociation from it, and making them suspicious about whether 
perpetrators are dealt with.13  
All these events and publications served to bring about two things: they drew 
greater public and political attention to crime mapping and made the link 
between information provision and public engagement, conspicuously and 
repeatedly. Once the attention had been caught and the link accepted, only a 
short step is required to connect information provision with what is becoming 
the supra-ordinate aim of public bodies in the UK: that of public confidence.  
 
 
    Linking information and confidence  
  
If we accept the premise that information is the natural energy source fuelling 
empowerment, it should follow that informing the public will give them 
greater power. It is reasonable to hypothesize that a degree of 
empowerment—or at least a reduction in feelings of impotence—increases 
confidence on a general human level (Baranski and Petrusic, 1995). What then 
is the effect of the presence or absence of information on public confidence in 
the specific context of policing? The links between the provision of accurate 
crime data and greater confidence among the populace are probably borne out 
intuitively and empirically; but they are also made out on the more persuasive 
epistemological and practical levels too.  
Taking first the general experience of CDA and the research cited above, it is 
clear that, without information, the public become too remote from the 
realities that influence and characterize policing and criminal justice in their 
area. Leaving aside the difficulties of identifying—let alone categorizing—
‘the public’ (a term which appears to include everyone when not at work), the 
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link between provision of information to members of communities affected by 
criminal activity and the confidence within those communities is clearly made 
out, both within the Casey report and that of Giangrande. According to the 
former the public see the criminal justice system as a distant, sealed-off entity, 
unaccountable and unanswerable to them or to Government. In part this 
distance is created by the fact that little information about what happens to 
those who commit crime is placed in the public domain.  
In a report commissioned by the government, Professor Adrian Smith argues 
that:  
[At the local level] trust and confidence are closely related to perceived 
relevance, accord with experience and the local dialogue with law 
enforcement agencies, notably the police.14  
As for the practical correlation between confidence and information, the 
authors of the Reform report go further. They are prepared to argue that, not 
only is there evidence to suggest that the traditional remoteness they found in 
our criminal justice sector goes unaddressed by some organizations, but that 
this is in fact the organisations' intention in doing so; denying the public 
information to create electoral advantage or avoid scrutiny. This second 
proposition is corroborated elsewhere, one example of which is the reporting 
of Heather Brooke who has said:  
The police in Britain feel they "own" crime data and the public have no right 
to know what is happening.... In a void of ignorance, a politician or police 
chief can claim anything [they] like about crime: that binge drinking is 
endemic or under control, that muggings are increasing or falling, that 
policing is working or failing.  
She goes on to allege that this withholding of data allows the police to ‘hide 
their failings’ citing Northumbria Police who, she maintains, claimed that 
only three crimes of note had occurred one weekend in May 2008, yet a 
freedom of information request revealed that there were more than 1,000 
incidents, 161 of them being violent.15  
Whether or not these accusations (which is, in truth, what they are) are a fair 
deduction from the research is a separate matter; what is important here is that 
the reports clearly evince the nexus between information, effective public 
engagement and confidence.  
The provision of meaningful data however is not just a matter of data 
disclosure; it also requires a clear understanding and accommodation of the 
‘end user’. In this context, it is useful to note the findings of a government 
survey that showed that 47% of the UK population cannot understand 
‘straightforward, mathematical information’ nor can they ‘independently 
select relevant information from given numerical information’.16  
Such shortcomings in data analysis notwithstanding, in the context of policing 
and criminal justice Louise Casey's research in 2008 also restated the 
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importance of informing communities about what is really happening in their 
area. Again, this may not always have a wholly positive effect in and of itself, 
and there is evidence to show the asymmetric way in which the release of 
information by decision makers can be received (White and Eiser, 2005). In 
light of what we know, from the research of Casey and Giangrande and 
others, it is fair to conclude that the provision of relevant and meaningful 
information—good or bad—is at least essential to public understanding and 
contribution. As it is also important—either as a positive or negative 
influencing factor—to the wider issue of public confidence, there is an 
important practical and political element for policing in the UK, which is as 
follows.  
The government intends to sweep away the morass of police performance 
targets, replacing them instead with a single measure—that of public 
confidence.17 Together with the introduction of the Policing Pledge, this will 
mean that it is more important than ever for policing bodies to make 
information available to the communities in which relevant criminal activity, 
and the corrective activity of our public services, takes place. The ‘single 
target’ of public confidence was put in place at the same time and for the 
same reasons as the Policing Pledge: to increase the local accountability of the 
police and to empower communities.18 While there is still consultation on 
some of the finer aspects of measurement and calibration, improving 
confidence rates will be of supra-strategic importance for all involved in 
policing governance and delivery in the years to come.  
In this way, those responsible for the strategic direction of policing have not 
only accepted but also openly embraced the connection between the provision 
of timely and accurate information and the creation of public confidence. This 
marks an acceptance of a premise that has become embedded in jurisdictions 
such as the USA for years: that if people are either to consider doing anything 
about crime or, at least to frame the questions they ask of those whose job it is 
to do so—they need an accurate (as opposed to a purely apochryphal or 
anecdotal) picture of criminal activity in their neighbourhood. Of course, it 
could be argued that providing accurate crime data that reveal high levels of 
serious crime in a certain locality would reduce confidence in some areas on 
the basis that this would amount to official confirmation of people's worst 
suspicions and that things are in fact as bad as they seem—or perhaps worse. 
This argument may have some merit19 although there is little independent 
research available to make the case in the UK, but it is clear that there is a 
growing body of opposition to the publication of crime data that is too 
accurate or too specific. And therein lies the fundamental dilemma of the 
crime mapper, a dilemma that appears to be predicated on the regulatory 
arrangements for the publication of data.  
 
 
    Too true to be good?  
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It is proposed that, in the context that concerns us here, data are either 
accurate or useless. For example, knowing that an area of several hundred 
kilometres2 has no more than an ‘average’ (however computed or arrived at) 
number of robberies this year is perhaps of little value if someone is trying to 
get a picture of how violent the streets are around their child's school or the 
roads around their parents’ home. Similarly, is it any better knowing that there 
was some vague form of dishonesty offence (but not burglary) committed 
somewhere near X Street or the junction of Y Road at some unspecified point 
in the past 6 months?  
When it comes to crime information, it is submitted that, other than to the 
ostrich population, the degree of confidence that can be derived from data is 
in direct proportion to their accuracy. For it to be of value to the police, crime 
information must be sufficiently specific to inform decision makers promptly, 
consistently and reliably about that which concerns them most. The same 
must be true of the rest of us. However, the framework regulating data 
protection and publication in the UK works in almost the opposite direction: 
the greater the degree of proposed specificity the greater the risk and therefore 
the greater the regulation militating against it.  
Plainly there are certain crime types where the very nature of crime requires 
particular sensitivity, and this is recognized expressly in criminal statutes so 
far as the law of England and Wales is concerned.20 But in terms of other 
more generic but sensitive data, it is the civil legal arrangements regulating 
publication and disclosure that present a barrier to organizations wishing to 
make information accessible to the public.  
This tension became apparent in the early stages of development of crime 
mapping by police organizations and the Office of the Information 
Commissioner wrote to several police organizations urging great caution 
before moving towards what was being described as a ‘New York’ model of 
crime mapping. Boris Johnson's reported response for the Metropolitan Police 
was to amend their mapping website and make the data far less specific than 
had been originally planned.21 This was clearly a move away from what the 
Conservative party leader David Cameron had originally encouraged: he had 
exhorted every police force in the country to record every crime online, every 
month, in map form.22  
In addition, some organizations such as the Jill Dando Institute, have 
expressed real concerns around the publication of crime data that are too 
specific or insufficiently controlled and contextualized. In what they regard as 
‘the worst cases’, they maintain that crime mapping  
...may actually increase the public's fear of crime, prompt greater scepticism 
over crime statistics and generate more negative debate about the 
performance, accountability and transparency of police forces and [statutory 
crime reduction partnerships].23  
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This response finds some support in wider research around the nexus between 
trust and the provision of information and, in the context of policing, it is not 
yet safe to assume that greater candour will always produce greater 
confidence (White and Eiser, 2007). The general response from crime data 
providers has therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, shown a similar degree of 
caution to that of the Metropolitan Police, with two approaches being 
adopted. The first approach is the ‘choropleth’ model,24 used in one form or 
another by all other police organizations in England and Wales; the second is 
the West Yorkshire model showing dots-on- maps.  
 
 
    Hotspots and averaging  
  
If the primary purpose of providing crime data is to inform people who are 
interested in or intending to involve themselves with a location, the data need 
to have a degree of specificity that supports that aim.  
As the US Department of Justice website explains, crime is not spread evenly 
across maps; rather it tends to congeal around some areas and is absent from 
others. People can (and do) use this knowledge in their daily activities, 
avoiding some places and seeking out others with their choices of 
neighbourhoods, schools and recreation areas being influenced by the 
knowledge that their chances of being a victim are increased or reduced 
accordingly. In short, crime is not evenly distributed and the risk of our being 
a victim of crime is not geographically constant. Therefore, to provide crime 
data in a way that highlights hotspots or averages out the areas of offending as 
though they were areas of equal atmospheric pressure joined by isobars is of 
limited utility to the literal and figurative ‘person in the street’. But this is 
what the vast majority of crime mapping sites in the UK do. Following an 
ellipse or choropleth methodology, these sites seek to join areas of similar 
criminal activity and illustrate them either with general hotspots or by 
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Figure 1: Extract from the Metropolitan 
Police crime mapping website  
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Figure 2: Extract from West Yorkshire's 
Beatcrime map  
 
  
In this way the ellipse and choropleth maps imply that the designated areas 
share the same risk level, rendering specific streets or locations irrelevant. But 
their lack of relevance does not only relate to the methodology and its 
underlying assumptions: it is equally irrelevant to persons trying to access the 
data in order to inform decisions about their life and livelihood. This criticism 
finds support from Professor Adrian Smith who states that  
more and better crime information has to be available at a sufficiently local 
level and communicated in a form that relates to the individual member of the 
public's day-to-day experience of living or working in an area.25  
 
 
    Beatcrime  
  
Whether or not the reticent approach of other police organizations and the 
attendant shrinking from full and frank disclosure provides evidence of what 
the outgoing Chief Inspector of Constabulary referred to as the inherent ‘risk 
aversion’ to be found throughout UK policing (Flanagan, 2008) is debatable. 
What it does demonstrate is the gap between ambition and delivery in crime 
mapping within England and Wales.  
In contrast, the approach adopted in West Yorkshire has sought to reconcile 
the tensions between accessibility and sensitivity with a clear focus on the 
public interest and a bias towards accuracy.  
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Naturally, the West Yorkshire model recognizes that there are sensibilities 
around certain types of crime and criminality, as well as legal restrictions on 
publishing information from which victims might be identified. Similarly, 
although someone suitably motivated and having the right software could 
possibly extrapolate from the West Yorkshire data a specific address outside 
which a car had been stolen or a person robbed, but is this a reason to 
withhold or adulterate all the data all the time? An alternative approach that 
has been suggested involves ‘moving’ the locus of the offence a set distance 
in a random direction (say within a radius of 30 m). While this would 
certainly reduce the likelihood of identifying a particular person or place, the 
adulteration of the data would surely have a similar diluting effect on its 
utility and therefore its efficacy in informing and empowering the public. 
There is, it is proposed, an irreducible minimum beyond which data become 
so vague as to be at best unhelpful and at worst damaging to public 
confidence in that it dashes expectations and hints at disingenuousness.  
For this reason, the West Yorkshire Beatcrime model plots reported crimes 
down to the street where they occurred and, although there are special 
considerations for isolated places (e.g. remote dwellings within farmland), the 
approach tries wherever possible to identify the true location of the crime.  
Notwithstanding these efforts, Giogrande et al. remain critical of the lack of 
specificity in the information provided by those police authorities such as 
West Midlands and West Yorkshire who do make such information available 
(although they do describe a Metropolitan Police test site that provides 
burglary, robbery and vehicle offences per month and yearly trends as 
‘promising’).  
Though compared, these sites are not comparable because, at the time of 
writing at least, the degree of detail provided by police bodies in England and 
Wales is not simply variable but also binary: the only police force providing 
specific ‘dots-on-maps’ type information about specific geographical 
locations is the West Yorkshire Police. Nevertheless, bloggers and 
commentators from the CDA community go further than Giogrande and make 
the argument supra that averaging should be avoided altogether, and point 
data should be used instead, with all maps having overlays to explain crime 
spikes and day/night splits. On the other hand, the highly regulated 
environment of the UK places some real hurdles in the way of public bodies 
that wish to open their data banks to scrutiny, at the heart of which beats the 
European Convention on Human Rights which seeks constantly to balance the 
competing interests of the individual, the State and the wider public good. 
Beneath that framework there is the domestic legislation such as the Data 
Protection Act 1995 (which applies a series of principles that must be applied 
by all who keep personal data records) and the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 that is designed to facilitate public access to data collated by public 
bodies. Responsibility for overseeing the operation of this legislative 
framework generally falls to the Office of the Information Commissioner 
(OIC) who wrote to a number of police organizations and the Home Office 
during the development of crime mapping identifying areas of potential 
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conflict between the rights of individuals and the wider public interest and 
seeking reassurances before their sites went ‘live’.  
Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK, there have 
been some significant and substantial challenges to the State's collection and 
use of personal data for criminal justice purposes—most notably the challenge 
to the police practice in England and Wales of retaining DNA data on 
individuals even after they have been found not guilty of an offence or 
proceedings against them have been discontinued (S & Marper v UK, 2008). 
Interestingly, the OIC has itself recently required the government to abandon 
its practice of withholding details of parties to employment disputes and to 
reveal the names and addresses of organizations involved in proceedings 
before the employment tribunals.26  
Nevertheless, despite the provisions of the freedom of information regime and 
the decisions of the OIC, there remains something of a contrast between the 
UK and the much more open data culture elsewhere, for example the USA 
where, although there are similar federal and constitutional laws balancing 
privacy with publicity, practices are distinctly different and prosecution 
policies are openly discussed on weblogs and in public forums. Giogrande 
recognizes that the legal and cultural approach in countries such as the USA 
differs significantly from that of the UK and cites some very useful examples 
that evidence the position (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2006; Kerr and 
Shelton, 2001).  
 
 
    The future  
  
The corrolary to CDA is a reverse flow of information from communities 
back towards their public services. Indeed if the Policing Pledge in the UK is 
to take the form of a sort of contractual undertaking, then beyond the basic 
consensus ad idem there needs to be some ‘consideration’ flowing from the 
other contracting party: the citizen. This remains a largely unexplored benefit 
of crime mapping and is one that it will potentially allow a two-way exchange 
of information between the police and the policed. Though yet to mature, it is 
easy to see how this two-way interaction using crime mapping might work. 
By choosing to visit the site, individuals are indicating their interest in the 
work of the relevant policing organization. As such these visitors form a self-
selecting group who might be interested in helping the police in other 
consultation programmes or in wider participative activities that address the 
issues underlying the published statistics, from crime detection to preventing 
violent extremism. Not only would this fit within the generic statutory 
obligation on police authorities in England and Wales to consult with their 
communities; it would also be consonant with the strategy, for example, of the 
West Yorkshire WaYs to meaningful engagement.27 Interactive mapping will 
help the Police Authority to show what has been done and indicate where the 
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improvement is to be found, before beginning the consultation cycle once 
more.  
The crime mapping system can also have benefits in terms of performance 
monitoring, testing the effect of policing initiatives and the visibility of 
information provision down to a neighbourhood level, with the nature, 
frequency or content of visits to the site revealing something about the user or 
usage. Postal or zip code trawls will allow the site host to group the areas of 
search and therefore see, for example, if there has been any increased activity 
in enquiries around an area where there has been targeted action or 
communication. But then this activity itself raises questions of data 
monitoring and privacy. Then there is the larger consideration of expense; 
maintaining up-to-date sites is an expensive endeavour—which might be why 
most examples of crime mapping sites in the USA are not maintained by the 
police at all but by external bodies to whom the crime data are given by the 
relevant criminal justice agency.28 Providers of UK crime maps will need to 
consider these practicalities as the expectations of their communities become 
increasingly sophisticated in their demands. An alternative to outsourcing 
control of the sites might be some form of commercial sponsorship (for 




    Conclusion  
  
However they map out, the activities of the 43 police forces of England and 
Wales will carry some risk in the future. The first risk is that they are 
challenged under the regulatory framework for maintaining individual 
privacy. Another is that they might be challenged by business interests such 
as estate agents claiming that the publication has adversely affected already 
falling house prices.30 The answer to such challenges surely lies in the fact 
that it is not the publication of the data that ought to concern us but rather the 
fact that the crimes have occurred. In addressing the situation complained of, 
it is interesting to ask the question "which of the following is preferable: 
galvanization of joint efforts to prevent the reality of criminal activity in a 
particular area or suppression of the truth in order to create a more favourable 
but inaccurate perception?" Is this really what public confidence requires? But 
there are, it is submitted, far greater risks. One, highlighted by Giogrande, is 
that the crime mapping sites fail to go beyond mere presentation of a criminal 
activity and avoid stating what was done about it. In his view, merely 
presenting detail of the crime without the correction gives a very unbalanced 
view of UK criminal justice to the public.31 In this light, there must be a 
strong argument in favour of, for example, sentence mapping showing how 
cases are disposed of at each court within a locality for the same reasons as 
crime mapping: to provide clear and reliable evidence of the relevant activity 
being undertaken by the criminal justice system and also to address any 
perception that the courts are being unduly lenient with those they convict.32  
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Whatever the manner and form that criminal justice ‘mapping’ takes in the 
future, in mitigating or closing out the relevant risks, the challenge for public 
authorities will be to balance accuracy with sensitivity and privacy. While in 
technological terms ‘the use of statistical devices of various kinds on maps is 
limited only by the analyst's imagination’ (Harries, 1999); the reality for those 
policing organizations seeking to produce accurate and useful crime maps in 
the UK is ‘far harder than it appears’ and—as the Home Office has been 
warned—‘does not rely only on geographical information’33 though, at the 
request of the Home Office, Pitney Bowes MapInfo has at least released a 
white paper on best practice34 to help them. The paper itself envisages 
fundamental problems because ‘a significant amount of crime goes 
unrecorded, location may be uncertain, and time of day, seasons and even the 
activities of the police will make figures vary’35 and suggests a wide amount 
of consultation with local authorities, social, health and emergency services, 
MPs, community groups as well as ‘crime pattern influencers’, business 
groups and others—including presumably the e-advocacy and e-activists 
referred to above.  
Further risk resides in the outsourcing options and the possibility of data sets 
being given to or taken over by the daunting array of professionals (lawyers, 
copyright experts, librarians, archivists, cartographers, engineers, 
communications activists, open source programmers and new media 
designers) prepared to offer their services in helping to make civic data and 
information ‘available to citizens without restrictions, at no cost, in usable 
open formats’.36 This would potentially lead to loss of control, consistency or 
(ironically) confidence.  
But perhaps one of the greatest strategic risks is that all 43 organizations will 
continue plotting their own crimes in their own way and proliferating a maze 
of systems that not only prevent public access to accurate data but also 
preclude any meaningful comparison across what are, in the end, entirely 
artificial boundaries.  
Whatever the future direction of crime mapping, former crime reporter 
Heather Brooke says37 that we cannot afford to ignore the issues set out here.  
When the deadline for all police forces to make crime mapping information 
available expired at midnight 31 December 2008, those organizations still 
faced something of a dilemma but ultimately the response to the growing 
expectation of civic data provision will call for the exercise of mature 
judgment.  
From a starting point that, as it has been collated and processed and analysed 
at the public's expense, the public have substantial intellectual property rights 
in the data sets, if people in communities are seriously expected to make a 
meaningful contribution to the debate around their public services, let alone 
assist in shaping their delivery, those in charge of the services must make sure 
that they are able to access the relevant information needed to make sense of 
the challenges. The biggest risk is, it seems, that public bodies are not yet 




    Notes  
  
1 Police Professional, 31 July 2008.  
2 www.Beatcrime.info.  
3 In England and Wales, the police authority is the legal body corporate that 
employs staff and provides governance to the relevant police force whose 
resources and officers are under the direction and control of the chief 
constable/commissioner (see the Police Act 1996).  
4 Police Professional, ibid.  
5 For example, see http://icicp.blogspot.com/; 
http://www.projectcensored.org/; 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/china-democracy-in-action.  
6 See also Citizens for Open Access to Civic Information and Data that 
describes itself as a ‘loose grouping of academics, activists, and citizens 
concerned with promoting data liberation in Canada’.  
7 The Guardian, 3 May 2008.  
8 The Register, 23 June 2008.  
9 The Times, 18 June 2008.  
10 Cm 7448.  
11 Closing the Gap, MORI 2008.  
12 www.direct.gov.uk/policingpledge.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Crime Statistics: An Independent Review Carried Out for the Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, November 2006.  
15 The Times, June 26, 2008.  
16 Skills for Life Survey 2003, DFES research report 490.  
17 Home Office Press Release, 5 March 2009.  
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18 See comments of the Policing Minister Vernon Coaker, MP, The Daily 
Telegraph, 7 January 2009.  
19 See, for example, observations of the Police Federation of England and 
Wales, The Daily Telegraph, 7 January 2009.  
20 See, for example, the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  
21 The Register, 25 June 2008.  
22 http://www.freeourdata.org.uk/blog/?p=194.  
23 http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/crime_mapping/web%20statistics.php.  
24 A technique used in Europe from the early 19th century but a term 
generally attributed to a geographer, J. K. Wright, with the American 
Geographical Society (AGS) in New York City in 1938.  
25 Ibid.  
26 OIC, 14 October 2008.  
27 This follows a cycle of We asked, You said, We acted, You saw.  
28 For example, U.S.: Crime Reports: ‘Crimereports.com is a US site built to 
help citizens get more information about the locations and frequencies of 
crime incidents in their cities.’  
29 For a good UK example, see the LASOS system operated within South 
Yorkshire with the support of the local government of Yorkshire and 
Humber–-www.lasos.org.uk.  
30 See the comments of the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, The Daily 
Telegraph, 7 January 2009.  
31 Ibid, p. 9.  
32 This, according to Casey (ibid.), is the single biggest contributor to public 
confidence in the criminal justice system.  
33 The Guardian, 11 December 2008.  
34 Pitney Bowes MapInfo Press Release, ‘Crime in Focus’, 2 December 2008. 
 
35 The Guardian supra.  
36 Citizens for Open Access to Civic Information and Data.  
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Published in 2011, the UK Cyber Security Strategy states that:  
 
“Our vision is for the UK in 2015 to derive huge economic and social value from a 
vibrant, resilient and secure cyberspace, where our actions, guided by our core values of 
liberty, fairness, transparency and the rule of law, enhance prosperity, national security and a 
strong society.”  
 
That the United Kingdom even has a cyber security strategy is telling. Governments and their 
agencies—not only in the United Kingdom but worldwide—have struggled to distinguish 
criminality that specifically relies on the use of the hyper-connectivity of global information 
technology from “ordinary” crime that is simply enabled by using information and 
communication technology. Despite legislative interventions such as the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime (for an analysis of which see Vatis, 2010, p. 207) in 2001, 
cyberspace remains a largely unregulated jurisdictional outpost.  
The first piece of criminal legislation to address the use—or rather the misuse—of computers 
in the United Kingdom was enacted in 1990. The recital to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
states that it was an act “to make provision for securing computer material against 
unauthorized access or modification; and for connected purposes.” This narrow, pre-Internet 
focus was very much predicated on the concept of a computer as a functional box (or network 
of boxes) containing “material” that required protection (Sampson 1991a, p. 211). Although 
the Act addressed unauthorized access, the concept of causing a computer to perform a 
function in furtherance of other crimes was also a central part of the new legislation 
(Sampson, 1991b, p. 58) which, for the first time in the United Kingdom, sought to catch up 
with computer technology that was becoming part of people’s everyday lives—a race in which 
the legislative process did not stand a chance.  
 
While the legislation was amended in 2006 with the introduction of a new criminal offence of 
unauthorized acts to impair the operation of a computer or program, etc., looking back through 
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today’s digital prism, the legislation has a decidedly analog look to it. When the legislation 
came into force we had little idea of the impact the “information super-highway” would have 
on our everyday lives, still less the engrenage effect of social media. According to the UK’s 
2011 Cyber Security Strategy, at the time of its publication 2 billion people were online and 
there were over 5 billion Internet-connected devices in existence. During that same year, the 
number of people being proceeded against for offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1991 
in England and Wales, accord- ing to a document from the Ministry of Justice, was nine 
(Canham, 2012) with no people being proceeded against for the two offences under s.1(1) and 
s.1(3). Perhaps as surprisingly, the records from the Police National Legal Database (PNLD) 
used by all police forces in England and Wales for offence wordings, charging codes, and 
legal research show that during two weeks (chosen at random) in 2013 the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990 and its constituent parts were accessed as follows:  
 
Between 4th and 10th March—907 times Between 10th and 16th 
November—750 times.  
 
Reconciling these two data sets is difficult. While it is clear from the PNLD access data 
that law enforcement officials in England and Wales are still interrogating the 1990 
legislation frequently (on average, around 825 times per week or 118 times per day or 
annually 42,900 times), the number of prosecutions for the correlative of- fences is 
vanishingly small. One of the many challenges with cybercrime and cyber- enabled 






Just as the shape of our technology has changed beyond all recognition since 1990, so too 
has the shape of the challenge. The almost unconstrained development of Internet-based 
connectivity can be seen, on one hand, as a phenomenological emancipation of the masses, 
an extension of the Civil Data Movement and the citizens’ entitlement to publicly held 
data (see (Sampson and Kinnear, 2010). On the other hand, the empowerment it has given 
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others (particularly sovereign states) to abuse cyberspace has been cast as representing the 
“end of privacy” prompting a petition to the United Nations for a “bill of digital rights.”  
 
Steering a predictably middle course, the UK strategy sets out the key—and, it is 
submitted, most elusive—concept within the document: that of a “vibrant, resilient, and 
secure cyberspace.” The aspiration must surely be right but how can resilience and security 
be achieved within a vibrant space run by computers? In terms of both computers and our 
reliance upon them, we have moved so far from the original notion of boxes, functions, 
commands and programs, along with the consequences that can be brought about by their 
use, that a fundamental re-think is needed.  
So what—and where—is cyberspace? Much has been written recently on the threat, risk 
and harm posed by “cybercrime,” “e-crime,” “cyber-enabled” criminality but the 
legislation has been left a long way behind. The EU has a substantial number of 
workstreams around its “Cybersecurity Strategy” and its own working definition of 
“cyberspace” though its own proposed Directive has no legal definition but rather one for 
Network and Information Security to match the agency established in  
 
2004 with the same name. In the United Kingdom, a parliamentary question in 2012 asked 
the Secretary of State for Justice how many prosecutions there had been for “e-crime” in 
the past 5 years. In response, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State gave statistics for 
ss 1(4), 2 and 3(5) of the Computer Misuse Act while the correlative Hansard entry uses 
the expression “cybercrime” in its heading.  
 
Wherever it is, constitutional lawyers around the world have wrestled with the 
applicability of their countries’ legislation with the borderlessness of the virtual word of 
the Internet; the application of “analog” territorial laws to the indeterminable digital 
boundaries of the infinite global communications network is, it seems, proving to be too 
much for our conventional legal systems. Here is why.  
 
When it comes to interpreting and applying law across our own administrative 
jurisdictional boundaries, an established body of internationally agreed principles, 
behavior, and jurisprudence has developed over time. Some attempts have been made to 
apply these legal norms to cyberspace. For example, the International Covenant on Civil 
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and Political Rights sets out some key obligations of signatory states. In addition, activities 
executed within or via cyberspace should not be beyond the reach of other community 
protections such as those enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights or the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, particularly where issues such as online child sexual 
exploitation are involved. The first basic challenge that this brings however, is that of 
jurisdiction.  
 
Cottim has identified five jurisdictional theories and approaches in this context, namely 
(Cottim A. 2010):  
1. Territorialitytheory:Thetheorythatjurisdictionisdeterminedbytheplace where the offence is 
committed, in whole or in part. This “territoriality theory” has its roots in the Westphalian 
Peace model of state sovereignty that has been in place since 1684 (see Beaulac, 2004, p. 
181). This approach has at its heart the presumption that the State has sovereignty over the 
territory under discussion, a presumption that is manifestly and easily rebuttable in most 
“cyberspace” cases. 	
	
2. Nationality (or active personality) theory: Based primarily on the nationality of the person 
who committed the offence (see United States of America v. 
Jay Cohen; Docket No. 00-1574, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir., July 31, 2001) where World Sports 
Exchange, together with its President, were defendants in an FBI prosecution for 
conspiracy to use communications facilities to transmit wagers in interstate or foreign 
commerce. The defendants were charged with targeting customers in the United States 
inviting them to place bets with the company by toll-free telephone call or over the 
Internet). While the Antiguan Company was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, the 
President was a US citizen and could, therefore, be arraigned before an American criminal 
court. 	
	
3. Passive personality theory: While the “nationality theory” deals with the nationality of the 
offender, the “passive personality theory” is concerned with the nationality of the victim.	
 
In what Cottim calls “the field of cybercriminology,” a good example of this jurisdiction 
assumption can be seen in a case where a Russian citizen who lived in Chelyabinsk, Russia 
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was sentenced by a court in Hartford Connecticut for hacking into computers in the United 
States. 
 
4.  Protective theory: Cottim’s “protective theory” (also called “security principle”  
and “injured forum theory”) deals with the national or international interest injured, 
assigning jurisdiction to the State that sees its interest—whether national or international—
in jeopardy because of an offensive action. Cottim sees this rarely used theory as applying 
principally to crimes like counterfeiting of money and securities.  
 
5.  Universality theory: In his final theory, Cottim identifies the approach of universality based 
on the  
international character of the offence allowing (unlike the others) every State to claim of 
jurisdiction over offences, even if those offences have no direct effect on the asserting State. 
While this theory seems to have the most potential for applicability to cyberspace, there are 
two key constraints in the way it has been developed thus far. The first constraint is that the 
State assuming jurisdiction must have the defendant in custody;  
the second is that the crime is “particularly offensive to the international community.” While 
this approach has, Cottim advises, been used for piracy and slave trafficking there is 
considerable practical difficulty in defining the parameters of the universality approach even 
in a conventional context and the possibility of extending it to cover cyberspace offending 
and activity is as yet unexplored.  
 
When it comes to conventional extra-territorial challenges, the device of focusing on key 
elements such as the nationality of the offender and the geographical location of the causal 
conduct or consequent harm has produced some successful prosecutions for (and perhaps 
thereby deterred) some conventional cyber-enabled offending. For example, Cottim cites a 
case where the Managing Director of CompuServe Information Services GmbH, a Swiss 
national, was charged in Germany with being responsible for the access—in Germany—to 
violent, child, and animal pornographic representations stored on the CompuServe’s server 
in the United States. The German court considered it had jurisdiction over the defendant, 
although he was Swiss, he lived in Germany at the time. The Amtsgericht court’s approach 
has been criticized as not only unduly harsh but as unsustainable and it is difficult to argue 
with Bender who says “it must be noted that the ‘law-free zones’ on the Internet cannot be 
filled by a ruling like this, but need a new self-regulatory approach” (Bender, 1998).  
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In some cases litigants also use the jurisdictional differences to argue down the gravity of 
the sanction or the extent of their liability, particularly where the perpetrator from one 
jurisdiction brings about consequence in another. A good recent example is Klemis v 
Government of the United States of America [2013] All ER (D) 287 where the UK 
defendant allegedly sold heroin to two men in Illinois, USA. One of the men subsequently 
died and raised questions at the point of sentencing as to how the different legislatures in the 
two jurisdictions had set the requirements for the relevant actus reus (criminal act) and the 
mens rea (culpable state of mind) differently. Another recent example of trans-jurisdictional 
friction is Bloy and Another v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2013] EWCA Civ 1543. In that case 
a road traffic collision in the United Kingdom had been caused by a Lithuanian national who 
had been uninsured at the time. The Motor Insurers’ Bureau is the UK compensation body 
for the pur- poses of the relevant EU Directive and was obliged to pay compensation where 
a UK resident had been injured in a collision in another Member State caused by an unin- 
sured driver. In such cases, the Directive enabled the Bureau to claim reimbursement from 
the respective compensatory body in the other Member State. However, under the domestic 
law of Lithuania the liability of the compensatory body was capped at €500k. The Bureau 
argued that its liability to pay the victim should be capped by Lithuanian domestic law even 
though the collision happened on an English road.  
 
Clearly the challenges of unauthorized access and use of data obtain; so too do the 
jurisdictional challenges of locus of initiators and consequences. However, these have to be 
understood in the context of the much more pernicious and truly viral threats such as denial 
of service attacks, malware, data espionage and what Cottim calls the scareword of “cyber-
terrorism” which has now become formally adopted by many law enforcement agencies, 
politicians and commentators. The reality is that, with the requisite knowledge and 
motivation, a teen with a laptop can alter the “use by” dates on food products in a packing 
plant on the other side of the world, or command the central heating system of a neighbor’s 
Internet-connected home to overheat, or send the traffic lights in a far away city into a 
frenzy. The further reality is that the wattle-and-daub constructs of conventional law making 
in common law countries, along with their correlative law enforcement practices, will not 
provide the answer to these threats and risks and even staples such as “crime scenes” and 
“perpe- trators” are no longer adequate within the new frontier of cyberspace.  
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However, it is not just the domination and manipulation of cyberspace by criminals that has 
caused public concern. The aftermath of the Edward Snowden rev- elations about intrusive 
governmental espionage demonstrated that cyberspace is regarded as a potentially perilous 
place by private users not just in fear of becoming victims of remote criminality. There is 
also a real fear that the technological environment allows state agencies to operate in highly 
intrusive yet anonymous and unaccountable ways, prompting the CEOs of some of the 
world’s leading IT companies to write an open letter to the President of the United States 
demanding reform of cyberspace surveillance based on a series of overarching principles 
that guarantee the free flow of information yet limit governmental authority and impose a 
substantial degree of oversight (Armstrong et al., 2013).  
 






The population of cyberspace is estimated by the UK government to be >2 billion. While we 
do not accurately know the frequency or longevity, this means that one- third of Earth’s 
population visit cyberspace and billions more are anticipated to join them over the next 
decade, exchanging over $8 trillion in online commerce.  
 
According to the Commissioner of the City of London Police, “cyber” fraud (broadly 
offences of dishonesty committed by use of computer networks) costs the UK £27 billion 
per year while “cyber breaches” (presumably involving the unauthorized in- filtration of a 
private or public computer network) have been recorded by 93% of small and medium 
businesses in the United Kingdom in 2013, an increase of 87% on the previous year.  
 
Aside from some of the peculiar criminological features unique to crime com- mitted in 
cyberspace (such as the absence of any real motive for anyone—individual or corporate 
victims or their Internet Service Providers—to report crimes involving fraud) the basic 
challenge facing us now seems to be how to get to grips with the concept of cyberspace—
vibrant, resilient, secure or otherwise. Having separated cybercrime from cyber-enabled 
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crime in the same way we might separate crime within a transport network from crime 
where the transport network is merely an enabler, surely we need to begin to treat 
cyberspace for what it is: a separate socio-spatial dimension in which people choose not 
only to communicate, but also to dwell, trade, socialize and cultivate; to create intellectual 
property, generate economic wealth, to begin and end relationships; to forage, feud and 
thrive; to heal and harm. Viewed in this way cyberspace is another continent, vast, viable 
and virtual, a distinct jurisdiction requiring its own constitution and legal system, its own 
law enforcement agents and practices. The Director of Operational Policing Support for 
Interpol’s General Secretariat, Michael O’Connell, has compared the movement across 
cyberspace with “the 2 billion passenger movements across the world.” The reality is that 
cyber travellers move around the borderless virtual globe with almost immeasurable speed, 
almost zero cost and almost total anonymity.  
 
The challenge of tackling cyber security stretches way beyond simply standardizing our 
legal frameworks. The UK Government has also recognized that “Without effective cyber 
security, we place our ability to do business and to protect valuable assets such as our 
intellectual property at unacceptable risk.” In the report commissioned by the UK 
Government, Price Waterhouse Coopers estimate that there are over 1000 different global 
publications setting out cyber standards. Moreover, their assessment of the standards 
situation across organizations looked patchy and incomplete.  
 
While the awareness of cyber security threats and the importance placed on them was 
generally found to be high, the efforts to mitigate cyber security risk differ significantly with 
the size of the organization and its sector. The report found that only 48% of organizations 
implemented new policies to mitigate cyber security risks and only 43% conducted cyber 
security risk assessments and impact analysis to quantify these risks. The report also found 
that 34% of organizations who purchased certified products or services did so purely to 
achieve compliance as an outcome. Although the authors are clear in pointing out that the 
online survey reached an audience of ~30,000 organizations, it produced around 500 
responses, not all of them complete. Nevertheless, the picture that emerges from the report is 





Aside from stretching and reworking legal principles such as jurisdiction and issuing 
strategies, there have been several key responses to the challenges of cybercrime and cyber-
enabled criminality. For example, the Metropolitan Police Service was recently reported as 
having substantially expanded its E-crime unit to a reported 500 officers in response to the 
threat of “cybercrime” having become a Tier One National Security threat. This is consistent 
with the responses having effect across the UK law enforcement community. The Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011—the legislation that created elected police and 
crime commissioners— also introduced the concept of the Strategic Policing Requirement 
(SPR). The SPR is published by the Home Secretary and sets out those national threats that 
require a coordinated or aggregated response in which resources are brought together from a 
number of police forces; it applies to all police forces in England and Wales and is referred 
to by other law enforcement agencies throughout the United Kingdom.  
 
The SPR identifies how police forces and their governance bodies often need to work 
collaboratively inter se, and with other partners, national agencies or national arrangements, 
to ensure such threats are tackled efficiently and effectively.  
 
The SPR contains five areas of activity and threat that are, if at a Tier One or Tier Two risk 
level in the National Security Risk Assessment, covered. These are:  
• Terrorism (Tier One)  
• Other civil emergencies requiring an aggregated response across 
police force  
boundaries  
• Organized crime (Tier Two)  
• Threats to public order or public safety that cannot be managed by a 
single  
police force acting alone  
• A large-scale cyber incident (Tier One) including the risk of a hostile 
attack  
upon cyberspace by other states  
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The SPR recognizes that there may be considerable overlap between these areas. For 
example, there may be a substantial organized crime element involved in a cyber 
incident and vice versa. All elected police and crime commissioners and their respective 
chief police officers must have regard to the SPR in their planning and operational 
arrangements. This is an important legal obligation for reasons that are discussed below.  
 
Having set out these key risks to national security, the SPR requires policing bodies to 
have adequate arrangements in place to ensure that their local resources can deliver the 
requisite: Capacity Capability Consistency Connectivity and Contribution to the national 
effort (the five “‘Cs”).  
 
 
Given the legal and practical difficulties that are explored infra, the extent to which local 
policing bodies are in a position to meet these criteria in a meaningful way in relation to 
“cyber incidents”—whether “upon” or within cyberspace is ques- tionable. For example, 
while it is a relatively simple task to assess the capacity and capability of a group of local 
police force (even a large one such as the Metropolitan Police) to tackle large-scale 
public disorder, and to measure the connectivity of their resources in preparing for such 
an event, it is far harder to demonstrate that the same forces meet the five C requirements 
(capability, connectivity, and so on) required to understand and respond to even a highly 
localized cyber incident, still less a cyber attack sponsored by another state. This too is 
important because the courts in the United Kingdom have interpreted the expression 
“have regard to” a government pol- icy as meaning that public bodies fixed with such a 
duty must above all properly un- derstand that policy. If a government policy to which a 
public body must have regard is not properly understood by that body this has the same 
legal effect as if that body had paid no regard to it at all. Further, if a public body is 
going to depart from a gov- ernment policy to which it must “have regard,” that body has 
to give clear reasons for doing so, such that people know why and on what grounds it is 
being departed from. While the EU might have a series of arrangements in place which 
require Member States to notify them of “incidents” that “seem to relate to cyber 
espionage or a state- sponsored attack” and invoke the relevant parts of the EU Solidarity 
Clause, there is little evidence that most police areas would be in a position confidently 
to make that assertion, promptly or at all.  
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Quaere: how well are all affected police agencies in England and Wales able to 
demonstrate that they have properly understood the threat of a cyber attack in the context 
of the SPR? If the answer to this is anything other than an unqualified “yes,” then they 






Tackling computer-enabled criminality has generally focused on the physical presence of 
those controlling, benefiting, or suffering from the remote activity—it has been 
concerned with input and output. The European Union has a proposed Directive to re- 
quire Member States to ensure they have minimum levels of capability in place, along 
with Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and arrangements for effective 
coordination of “network and information systems.” At the same time the Budapest 
Convention has been in force for almost a decade to provide a model for the many 
signatory nations (including the United States) to draft their domestic “cybercrime” 
legislation and the correlative cyber security industry is vast and burgeoning. But is there 
not a pressing need to tackle what is taking place in cyberspace itself? Using existing 
jurisdictional theories is arguably not enough; what is needed is not a partial application 
of some extra-cyberspace laws adapted to suit some extra-cyberspace consequences. 
Continuing to apply the traditional criminological approaches to technological 
innovation in the  context of cyberspace is, it is submitted, rather like separating 
criminality that takes place within an underground transport network from that where the 
offender uses the London Underground to facilitate their offending. In the first situation 
the setting is a key component of the offending while, in the second, it is a chosen part of 
the wider modus operandi and the offender might just as easily have chosen to take the 
bus, a taxi or to walk to and from the locus of their crime. This is the fundamental 
difference between cyber-enabled offending and offending within cyberspace. Policing 
the exits and entrances is never going to be a complete or even satisfactory answer to the 
latter. Aside from the practical and jurisprudential reasons, there are also important 
political imperatives beginning to emerge. For example India’s Telecom and IT Minister 
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Kapil Sibal asserted recently that there should be “accountability and responsibility” in 
the cyberspace in the same way as in diplomatic relations:  
“If there is a cyberspace violation and the subject matter is India because it 
impacts India, then India should have jurisdiction. For example, if I have an 
embassy in New York, then anything that happens in that embassy is Indian 
territory and there applies Indian Law.”  
 
 
For this approach to go beyond the conventional jurisdictional approaches 
considered supra would require a whole new set of processes, procedures and 
skills; it would take more than the publication of a set of agreed standards or 
an agreed recipe for domestic legislation. There needs, it is submitted, to be a 
new presence in cyberspace, a dedicated cyber force to tackle what the 
Director-General of the National Crime Agency, Keith Bristow, calls “digital 
criminality.” Perhaps what is needed is not a new way of overlaying our 
conventional law enforcement assets and techniques on cyberspace or a new 
way of extending our two-dimensional constructs of jurisdiction to fit a multi-
dimensional world, but a new wave of cyber assets—“cyber constables” as it 
were—to patrol and police the cyber communities of the future. However, 
given our global experience of the ways in which some state agencies have 
operated within cyberspace, in the post-Snowden era that perennial question 
of democratic law enforcement “quis cusodiet” sits just as fixedly above 
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Big Data “calls for momentous choices to be made between weighty policy 
concerns” (Polonetsky and Tene, 2013). The weighty policy concerns also 
have to weigh in the balance the most efficient and effective use of available 
resources with the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. One of the 
weightiest policy concerns is that of law enforcement. The setting of law 
enforcement raises several dilemmas for Big Data; because Big Data 
represents such an expansive, dynamic, and complex subject, this chapter is 
necessarily selective and succinct.  
 
In the opinion of the European Union Data Protection Working Party,6 “Big 
Data” refers to exponential growth in both the availability and the automated 
use of information. Big Data refers to “gigantic digital datasets held by 
corporations, governments and other large organisations, which are then 
extensively analysed using computer algorithms.”  
	
ATTRACTIONS	OF	BIG	DATA	 
One of the principal attractions—if not the principal attraction—of Big Data 
is its enabling of analytics, the almost limitless power that attends the super-
synthesis of information.  Offering what perhaps are the obverse attractions of 
nano-technology, Big Data’s giga-analytics can produce macro-level pictures 
of trends, pathways, and patterns that might reveal pictures hitherto unseen 
even by the data owners. Such tele-analytics allow not only a better 
understanding of what may be happening here and now, but a reliable basis 
for predictions of what is to come.  
 
	
6Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 00,569/13/EN WP 203 Opinion 03/13, p. 35. 
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Aside from the obvious attraction for commercial suppliers trying to 
understand, predict, and influence consumer behavior, Big Data analytics also 
holds out a phenomenological capability for law enforcement agencies in 
trying to understand, predict, and influence behaviors of offenders and 
potential offenders.  
As Professor Akghar from CENTRIC7 puts it, “When we look at ways to 
advance the use of data and analytics for public security and safety, the 
potential has never been greater. We now have the computing power to not 
only understand past events, but also to create new knowledge from billions 
of data points—quickly. In minutes, we can run analyses that used to take 
days” (Akhgar, 2014).  
	
DILEMMAS	OF	BIG	DATA	 
With so much data so readily available, one might ask on what basis would 
law enforcement agencies (LEAs) not seize it and run with it as far and as fast 
as possible, if doing so meant preventing terrorist attacks, disrupting serious 
organized crime, or preventing wide-scale child sexual exploitation, human 
trafficking, and so forth?  
Take, for example, successful work in Greater Manchester 8 that has shown 
the power of having a range of agencies literally in the same room. Why not 
have the totality of their data virtually present in the same place, too? Because 
Big Data can be applied to mass datasets to reveal high-level trends and 
patterns, it might be thought that the extent to which it can assist in 
preventing and detecting criminality is limited. Not necessarily. As the 
Article 29 Working Party9 noted, not only can the awesome capability offered 
by Big Data be used to identify general trends and macro-correlations, it can 
also be processed—rapidly and almost effortlessly—to directly affect the 
individual.10  
	
7The Centre for Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence and Organised Crime Research at 
Sheffield Hallam University, UK 
8 See “Greater Manchester against crime: A complete system for partnership working,” available at: 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ jdi/events/mapping-conf/conf-2005/conf2005-downloads/dave-flitcroft.pdf. 
9 This Working Party is made up of EU member state national data protection authorities and is an 
independent advisory body on data protection and privacy. Established under Article 29 of the Data 
Protection Directive (95/46/EC), its role is to contribute to the uniform application of the Directive across 
member states.  
10 Data Protection Working Party loc. cit 
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From a practical operation perspective, then, there is a vast potential for Big 
Data in law enforcement. From a legal perspective, the point at which Big 
Data focuses this astonishing power on individuality can become highly 
contentious. One such point is where it is used for law enforcement, whether 
that is in the context of criminological extrapolation or criminal suspect 
extradition.  
The challenging question from a pragmatic law enforcement perspective is: If 
information is law- fully held within the databases of willing and socially 
responsible organizations that might help prevent people becoming victims of 
crime or bring perpetrators to justice, why would LEAs not only feel justified 
in accessing those data but obliged to do so?  
Part of the answer is that the application of informatics within a law 
enforcement environment is arguably different from that of Big Data 
application in most other settings. There are several strands to the answer, 
first among which is the high level of legal regulation of this area. Yes, there 
are substantial and significant exceptions within most legal data frameworks 
to allow access by LEAs to data held by others, particularly when their 
principal purpose is to prevent or investigate crime or pursue the interests of 
national security, but they are not always that clear and seldom amount to a 
blank check. Before looking more closely at some of the components of the 
law enforcement dilemma, it is necessary to look at the broad components of 
the legal framework within which the pragmatic law enforcement activity 




The legal framework regulating the Big Data challenges for law enforcement 
in the United Kingdom (UK) is dominated by that throughout all European 
Union (EU) member states. Primary law compo- nents (but by no means all) 
of that framework are to found in:  
 
o The European Convention on Human Rights  
o The European Charter of Fundamental Rights  
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o The EU Data Protection Directive 95/46–8  
o The Council of Europe Convention 10811—providing the main point 
of  
reference for the directive applying to data protection in policing and 
criminal justice 
o The Data Protection Act 1998 (based on the central principles of the  
Directive) 
o The Freedom of Information Act 2000, which created rights of access  
to information, superseding the Code of Practice on Access to 
Government Information and amending the Data Protection Act 1998 
and the Public  
Records Act 1958  
 
o The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, a very wide-ranging act  
making provision with respect to the retention and destruction of  
fingerprints, footwear impressions, and DNA samples and profiles  
taken in the course of a criminal investigation; requirements of  
schools and further education colleges to obtain the consent of parents  
of children under 18 years of age attending the school or college  
before the school or college can process a child’s biometric  
information; the further regulation of closed circuit television,  
automatic number plate recognition, and other surveillance camera  
technology operated by the police and local authorities; the need for  
judicial approval before local authorities can use certain data- 
gathering techniques; data provision with respect to parking  
enforcement and counter-terrorism powers.  
 
These are supported, extended, and elaborated upon in various other 
instruments too numerous to list here12 (for a guide, see Bignami, 2007; 
Holzacker and Luif, 2013).  
	
11 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
Council of Europe Treaties 108 (01/1981). 
12 See also, for example, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA for the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Data Protection 
Framework Decision) and the Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of June 23, 2008 on the stepping up of 
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Article 13 of the EU Directive provides that “member states may adopt 
legislative measures to restrict the scope of the obligations and rights 
provided for in Article 6 (1)...when such a restriction constitutes a necessary 
measure to safeguard...national security; defence; public security; the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences.” 
However, a qualified test must be applied to any restriction to ensure that the 
legislative measure meets the criteria that allow derogating from a 
fundamental right. There are two limbs to this test: First, the measure must be 
sufficiently clear and precise to be foreseeable; second, it must be necessary 
and proportionate, consistent with the requirements developed by the 




Much of the legislation and jurisprudence relating to data protection across 
the EU derives from human rights and fundamental freedoms. Clearly, there 
is not the space here to review the legal and political provenance of this 
subject. However, it is worth pausing at this stage to note and distinguish the 
two “distinct but related systems to ensure the protection of fundamental and 
human rights in Europe” (Kokott and Sobotta, 2013). The first, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, is probably known and understood by law 
enforcement personnel in the UK better than the second. The Convention is 
an international agreement between the States of the Council of Europe of 
which all member states are part, as are external states such as Switzerland, 
Russia, and Turkey. Matters engaging the Convention are ultimately 
justiciable in the European Court of Human Rights, which has jurisdiction 
over actions brought by individuals against member states for alleged 
breaches of human rights, and a substantial body of jurisprudence has been 
built up around this area.  
	
	
cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (the Prum 
Decision).  
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The second, less familiar system arises from the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (ECJ), which guarantees the protection of 
fundamental human rights within the EU. Respect of these rights is part of the 
core constitutional principles of the EU. Both systems are engaged by some 
activities around data capture, retention, and analysis, but a key distinction in 
relation to Big Data is that for most purposes, human rights protections treat 
the protection of personal data as a form of extension of the right to privacy.13 
(Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights incorporates this in 
the respect for an individual’s private and family life, home, and 
correspondence.) Article 8 prohibits interference with the right to privacy, 
except where such interference is in accordance with the generally applicable 
departures from the Convention article necessary in a democratic society.14 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, however, specifically enshrines data 
protection as a fundamental right in itself (somewhat unhelpfully under 
Article 8). This is distinct from the protection of respect for private and 
family life (Article 7). The Charter also establishes the principle of purpose 
limitation, requiring personal data to be processed “fairly for specified 
purposes” and stipulating the need for a legitimate basis for any processing of 
such data.  
 
Even the EU’s own legal framework for enshrining rights and freedoms for 
data subjects is not immune from challenge. For example, the ECJ found that 
the Data Retention Directive15 allowed the data retained under its aegis to be 
kept in a manner so as to allow the identity of the person with whom a 
subscriber or a registered user had communicated to be revealed as well as 
identify the time of the communication and the place in which that 
communication occurred.16 The Directive sought to ensure that data were 
available to prevent, investigate, detect, and prosecute serious crimes, and 
that providers of publicly available electronic communications services or of 
	
13 For an unusual police-related case, see ECtHR June 25, 1997, Halford v. The United Kingdom (no. 
20605/92, 1997-III). 
14 See, for example, Copland v. The United Kingdom (no. 62617/00 Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2007-I); ECtHR January, 12, 2010, Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom (no. 4158/05, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions, 2010).  
15 EU Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. 
16 Judgment in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Ireland and Seitlinger and Others. 
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public communications networks were obliged to reveal the relevant data. 
The ECJ held that those data might permit “very precise conclusions to be 
drawn concerning the private lives of the persons, whose data has been 
retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places 
of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social 
relation- ships of those persons and the social environments frequented by 
them.” The ECJ also held that the retention of data might have a chilling 
effect on the use of electronic communication covered by the Directive on the 
exercise of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.17  
Then there is the indiscriminate—or at least non-discriminating—nature of 
Big Data analytics. The automation of processing is not just a strength; it is 
almost a sine qua non of Big Data use. The dilemma for agencies tasked with 
the exercise of discretionary powers is that the greater the automation, the less 
scope arguably there is for intervention by the controlling mind and the 
application of discretion (which, as once described by Lord Scarman,18 is the 
police officer’s daily task). Much has been written and said of the use of “non 
fault” or “without cause” powers by the police and the absence of Scarman’s 
“safe- guard of reasonable suspicion” (see, e.g., Staniforth, 2013), and the 
general trend for law enforcement in the UK has been to move away from the 
blanket applications of powers.  
 
Interference by a member state with an individual’s rights under the European 
Convention must be “necessary in a democratic society” and have a 
legitimate aim to answer a “pressing social need,” but even then an identified 
interference must be proportionate and remains subject to review by the Court 
(Coster v. United Kingdom, 2001; 33 EHRR 479).19 Whereas the relationship 
between accuracy and reliability is clearly important in any form of data 
analysis, when the analysis is used at the level of the individual, biometrics, 
demographics, and social epidemiology take on a different legal quality. 
	
17 For a fuller explanation, see Boehm and Cole (2014). 
18 Report on the Brixton Disorders, April 10–12, 1981 (Cmnd. 8247), February 4, 1984  
19 See also Article 40 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, which states that it is the 
right of every child alleged to have infringed a penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the 
promotion of the child’s dignity and worth, reinforcing the respect for the child’s human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
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Almost by definition, Big Data deals with the supra-personal, the yotta-
aggregation of data that is unconcerned with the binary constructs of personal 
identity and individuality. However, the Working Party puts it thus: “The type 
of analytics application used can lead to results that are inaccurate, 
discriminatory or otherwise illegitimate. In particular, an algorithm might 
spot a correlation, and then draw a statistical inference that is, when applied 
to inform marketing or other decisions, unfair and discriminatory. This may 
perpetuate existing prejudices and stereotypes, and aggravate the problems of 
social exclusion and stratification.”20  
 
Just how little information Big Data needs to pinpoint an individual can be 
seen in Tene’s (2010) graphic citing of research that has shown how “a mere 
three pieces of information—ZIP code, birth date, and gender—are sufficient 




Within the legal framework protecting human rights are several key and 
interlinking concepts. The first such concept is purpose limitation. Purpose 
limitation is a key legal data protection principle21 that appears (as discussed 
above) in both limbs of the European framework engaging with data 
protection: the Convention on Human Rights and the European Charter on 
Fundamental Freedoms. Through this framework the law seeks to protect data 
subjects (in crude shorthand, those individuals to whom the relevant data 
relate) by setting limits, albeit flexible, on how the data controllers (equally 
crudely, those who are able to manage and direct the manner in which the 
data are used) are able to use their data.  
Purpose limitation, which has parallels in other jurisdictions (such as Article 
6 of Law n. 121/1981 in Italy; see Chapter 16 for more information), has two 
components. First is purpose specification, which means that the collection of 
	
15 Loc. cit. at p. 45.  
 
21 Article 6 (1)(b) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 24, 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (OJ L 281, November 23, 1995, p. 31). 
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certain types of data such as “personal data”22 must be for a “specified, 
explicit, and legitimate” purpose. The second element of purpose 
specification is “compatible use.” This means that the data must not be further 
processed (see below) in a way that is incompatible with those purposes.  
Arguably, the whole concept of Big Data analytics is predicated on some 
further perhaps even ulterior processing of data collected as a separate set or 
for a different, more specific purpose. The subsequent use of data represents a 
key barrier to lawful processing because of the requirement for compatibility. 
That is not to say that there can be no further processing, but such processing 
as there is will generally need to be compatible with the original lawful 
purpose or be exempt from that compatibility requirement. Even the recycling 
of personal data that has already been made publicly available remains 
subject to the relevant data protection laws.  
An important aspect of the further processing issue is the nature of the 
relationship between the controller and the data subject; in general terms, 
compatibility assessments should be more stringent if the data subject has not 
been given sufficient—or any—freedom of choice.  
 
Exemptions for processing personal data within the UK are widely drafted 
and include purposes such as the administration of justice, statutory functions, 
and public interest provisions, which cover the work of a whole range of 
public bodies. However, the number of community outcomes for which the 
police alone are responsible is vanishingly small and (certainly in the UK) 
almost every activity that keeps people safe and thriving is the product of 
collaborative enterprise and partnership. This level of engrenage is not 
specifically reflected by the law regarding data protection and processing. 
There are restrictions on data sharing, particularly when the organizations 
involved are in different jurisdictions. Then there are limitations on the 
aggregation and analysis of huge datasets generally, which can present 
barriers to the proper activities of LEAs and problems regarding reliability of 
extrapolation, interpola- tion, and identification. Public bodies such as police 
	
22 Personal data in England and Wales means data relating to an identified/identifiable living individual 
(Data Protection Act, 1998). 
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forces have no general power to share data and must do so only when they are 
able to indicate a power (expressed or implied) that permits them to do so.23  
 
A key challenge of Big Data for law enforcement therefore arises from the 
almost total reliance on partnerships within the British neighborhood policing 
model, which makes sectoral and functional separation (i.e., separation into 
public health, education, research) all but impossible. The best one can hope 
for is to identify the legitimate outcomes toward which the law enforcement 
partnership is work- ing, understand the key elements of the relevant data 
protection framework applicable to that setting, and aim for compliance.  
The relevant legislative frameworks, however, presuppose a “neat 
dichotomy” (Tene, 2010), whereas the increasingly collaborative manner in 
which businesses operate precludes a neat dichotomy between controllers and 
processors. Many decisions involving personal data have become a joint exer- 
cise between customers and layers upon layers of service providers. With the 
rise of cloud computing and the proliferation of online and mobile apps, not 
only the identity but also the location of data con- trollers have become 
indeterminate (Tene, 2010).  
This is challenging enough when the LEAs and partners are within EU 
members states. When non- member states are involved—as occurs in many 
cases particularly involving serious organized crime— there is an additional 
requirement of “adequacy of protection.” It is a key principle of the relevant 
legislation in member states that personal data must not be transferred outside 
the European Economic Area (EU member states and Norway, Iceland, and 
Lichtenstein) unless there is an ensured adequate level of protection for the 







23 For instance, the Ant-iTerrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, s. 17 
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Finally, and perhaps most important, there is public trust. The consensual 
model of policing in the UK entirely depends on the support of the 
communities within which the police operate. The principal fac- tor keeping 
relative order on the streets of the UK is not so much the presence of 140,000 
police offi- cers; rather, it is the legitimacy (Stanko, 2011) they enjoy among 
the 60 million people who tolerate and support them.  
	
Some key features of Big Data, such as behavioral targeting, have a different 
cachet in LEA settings, and the history of data processing within UK policing 
has not been without its difficulties. There have been various legal challenges 
to the use and retention of personal data by the police: for example, S & 
Marper v. United Kingdom (2008) ECHR 1581 (police retention of DNA 
samples of individuals arrested, but who are later acquitted or have the 
charges against them dropped, was a violation of right to privacy) and R (on 
the application of GC & C) v. The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
(2011) UKSC 21 (successful challenge of a policy of the Association of Chief 
Police Officers allowing indefinite retention of biometric samples, DNA and 
fingerprints for an indefinite period save in exceptional circumstances).  
 
Police monitoring of public protests has produced a series of legal challenges 
for which LEAs have not always managed to achieve the fine balance 
between the obligations of the state to ensure the security and safety of its 
citizens and its duty to ensure the protection of their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (see The Queen (on the application of Catt) v. The 
Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
and The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (2013) EWCA Civ 192). 
The Catt case involved a lawful demonstration and the indefinite retention of 
data about the applicant on the National Domestic Extremism Database. The 
case shows that even where the relevant event takes place in public, the 
recording and retention of personal data about individuals involved can be an 
unlawful interference with the right to respect for private life under Article 8 
of the European Convention of Human Rights.  
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Aside from the litigious challenges over operational retention and use of 
personal data, the police have also experienced the ignominy of having their 
official recognition removed by the Office for National Statistics because 
their data processing approaches for recording crime were found to be 
unreliable. The police found themselves the subject of a Parliamentary report 
called “Caught red handed: Why we cannot count on police recorded crime 
statistics,” published by the Public Administration Select Committee,24 whose 
chair, Bernard Jenkin, MP, said in the press release accompanying the report: 
“Poor data integrity reflects the poor quality of leadership within the police. 
Their compliance with the core values of policing, including accountability, 
honesty and integrity, will determine whether the proper quality of Police 
Recorded Crime data can be restored.”25 Shortcomings in data quality and 
reliability in the LEA context are not just about compliance and can have real 
and immediate detrimen- tal impacts on and within the criminal justice 
process.26  
The Public Administration Committee’s report was followed by a report of 
HM Inspector of Con- stabulary on the reliability of crime recording data 
created and maintained by the police forces of England and Wales.27 The 
interim report published on May 1, 2014, which drew upon several previous 
reports, referred to the Inspectorate’s “serious concerns” in the integrity of 
police crime recording data.  
Conversely, the failings of the police in England and Wales to retain relevant 
data in a searchable and shareable way, so as to enable the tracking of 
dangerous offenders such as Ian Huntley,28 were widely reported and 
criticized in the Bichard Report,29 which led to wholesale changes in the 
police approach to operational information technology capabilities. 
	
	






27 See http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/programmes/crime-data-integrity/. 
28 Convicted on December 17, 2003 of the murder of 10-year-old schoolgirls Holly Wells and Jessica 
Chapman. 
29 Report of the Bichard Inquiry HC 653 June 22, 2004, The Stationery Office, London.  
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The corrosive effect of such cases and the media’s reporting of them can be 
expected to damage public trust and confidence in the police and to affect the 
legitimacy they need to operate. When taken against the wider international 
context of “data-gate” and the Snowden revelations30 of how governments 
have been using Big Data analytics and high-tech information and 
communications technology monitoring capabilities, this reduced trust and 
confidence represents a serious impediment to even the lawful and compliant 
use of Big Data by LEAs in the future.  
	
CONCLUSIONS	 
Although the attractions of Big Data for LEAs are immediate and obvious, so, 
too, are the dilemmas it creates. The benefits of a capability of the scale 
offered by Big Data are readily apparent in every aspect of law enforcement, 
particularly where technology is used by perpetrators. For example, where the 
proscribed activities take place within the galactic setting of social media 
communications, such as in radicalization activities in terrorism and the 
online grooming of children and vulnerable victims in sexual offending, 
influencing behaviors and searching out prospects, the modus operandi 
almost invites a Big Data approach to both detection and prevention.  
It is one thing to get private organizations from the retail sector or business-
to-business suppliers working to certain data protocols, but what about LEAs? 
Staples such as individual consent and the right to be forgotten become much 
more difficult to apply, whereas exceptions such as the investigation, 
detection, and prevention of crime or—even broader—the public interest are 
much more readily applicable.  
	
HOW	FAR	SHOULD	BIG	DATA	PRINCIPLES	SUCH	AS	“DO	NOT	TRACK”	
AND	 “DO	 NOT	 COLLECT”	 BE	 APPLICABLE	 TO	 LEAS,	 EITHER	 IN	
QUALIFIED	FORMAT	OR	AT	ALL?	 
 
Can the developing legal framework around human rights and concepts such 
as privacy and identity offer sufficient protection, engender legitimacy, and 
	
30 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files 
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foster public trust? At this point the proposed Data Protection Regulation 
(Article 6 (4)) contains a broad exception from the compatibility requirement 
and if enacted, will allow a great deal of latitude for the further processing of 
personal data including a subsequent change of contractual terms. This 
potentially allows a data controller not just to move the goal posts, but to wait 
and see where the ball lands and then erect the goal around it. How will such 
relaxation of the rules be viewed by citizens, and what safeguards can they 
legitimately expect from their states?  
When it comes to Big Data, the higher the stakes, the greater the challenges 
for LEAs that risk being condemned for not using all available data to prevent 
terrorist atrocities or cyber-enabled criminality and damned if they do so to 
the detriment of individual rights and freedoms.  
 
As Polonetsky and Tene (2013) put it: “The NSA revelations crystallized 
privacy advocates’ con- cerns of sleepwalking into a surveillance society’ 
even as decision-makers remain loath to curb govern- ment powers for fear of 
terrorist or cybersecurity attacks.”  
 
One thing seems certain: The continued expansion of Big Data capability will 
inflate the correlative dilemmas it presents to our LEAs.  
	
25 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files.  
	
	
The resolution of the dilemmas of Big Data for LEAs—and by extension, for 
their partners in key areas such as safeguarding, fraud prevention, and the 
proper establishment of the rule of law in cyberspace—will be as much a 
challenge for the law as the technology. The dilemmas for LEAs are but one 
example of how our legal systems and principles need to catch up with the 
practices of their citizens’ lives. It will need a new breed, a form of lex 
veneficus,31 perhaps, to work alongside the technical wizards who have set the 
height of the Big Data bar.  
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“Intelligent Evidence: Using Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) in Criminal Proceedings” 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































“Following the Breadcrumbs: Using Open Source Intelligence as 
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings” Chapter 18 in 
“Open Source Intelligence Investigation – From Strategy to Implementation.” 












evidence	can	 always	 provide	 some	degree	 of	 intelligence	 the	 reverse	 is	
not	 the	case.	 If	 intelligence	 is	 to	be	relied	on	evidentially	 it	will	need	to	
meet	 the	 same	 forensic	 	standards	 and	 clear	 the	 same	 legal	 hurdles	 as	
any	 other	 form	 of	 evidence.	 Therefore	LEAs	 need	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 these	
standards	 and	 hurdles	 at	 the	 outset	 and	 to	 ensure—	 so	 far	 as	
practicable—that	 they	 are	 in	 a	 position	 to	 address	 them.	 This	 chapter	
addresses	 some	of	 the	 legal	 issues	 that	 arise	 if	OSINT	material	 is	 to	 be	










The	 provenance,	 collation,	 interpretation,	 analysis	 and	 deployment	 of	
open	 source	intelligence	 (OSINT)	 is	 becoming	 a	 highly	 topical	 and	
relevant	 area	 of	 policing.	 As	 has	 been	 considered	 in	 detail	 in	 earlier	
chapters	OSINT	can	be	considered	as	an	element	of	a	‘new	age’	in	policing	
and	as	an	adjunct	to	the	‘longer	arm	of	the	law’	(Chap.	3).	In	this	chapter	
we	are	 concerned	with	addressing	 some	of	 the	 legal	 issues	 that	arise	 if	






within	countries	 that	 are	 signatories	 to	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	
Human	Rights	 	(ECHR).	While	 each	 jurisdiction	will	 be	 governed	 by	 its	
own	domestic	 laws	 there	are	 some	 common	 elements	 around	 evidence	
and	 some	 overarching	 provisions	 	within	 the	 ECHR	 that	 will	 apply	 to	
relevant	 proceedings	 in	 each	 of	 the	 47	 signatory	 	States.2	 Both	 the	
generic	principles	of	evidence	and	the	ECHR	are	considered	below.		
 
The	 expansion	 of	 social	 media	 and	 Internet-based	 communication,	
together	 with	 	its	 relevance	 for	 criminal	 investigation	 and	 national	
security,	have	been	explored	and		discussed	in	the	previous	chapters.	It	is	
clear	 from	the	foregoing	 just	how	far	Law	 	Enforcement	Agencies	(LEA)	
have	come	to	understand	the	power	of	these	tools,	not		just	as	an	adjunct	
to	 their	 own	 communications	 (Coptich	 and	 Fox	 2010)	 but	 as	 a	 	game-
changing	 source	 of	 intelligence	 and	 investigation.	 The	 contribution	 of	
OSINT		to	inductive	investigation	has	yet	to	be	fully	understood,	still	less	
harnessed,	but	the		‘breadcrumbs’	 left	by	electronic	data	interactions	by	
suspects,	 victims,	witnesses	 and	 	other	persons	of	 interests	 represent	 a	
phenomenological	 change	 in	 the	 intelligence	 world.	 Following	 those	
breadcrumbs—in	both	senses	defined	above—in	order	to	 
find	 people,	 patterns,	 propensities	 or	 property	 is	 one	 thing;	 relying	 on	
the	material	to	support	a	prosecution	is	another	matter	altogether.	This	





event/activity/interest	 that	 unites	 the	 members	 of	 the	 community	
diminishes,	 so	 does	 the	 digital	 community	 itself	 (for	 examples	 see	
Beguerisse-Dıáz	et	al.	2014).	Law	Enforcement	Agencies	are	increasingly	













purposive.	 	The	 purpose	 of	 intelligence	 is	 wide	 ranging,	 almost	





proceeds	 of	 crime.	 Evidence,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 one	 function:	 to	
assist	a	court	or	finder	of	fact	to	determine	a	matter	that	has	come	before	
it.	 Of	 course,	 if	 the	matter	 coming	 before	 a	 court	 arose	 out	 the	 use	 of	
intelligence	 (for	 example	 a	 civil	 action	 against	 the	 police	 for	 wrongful	
arrest	based	on	flawed	information)	then	the	two	might	overlap.	Taking	
Staniforth’s	second	category	of	intelligence	(see	Chaps.	2	and	3),	the	end	
user	 of	 OSINT	 material	 is	 essentially	 the	 organization	 producing	 or	
collating	 it	 while	 with	 evidential	 material	 the	 recipient	 will	 be	 the	
relevant	tribunal.	 
	
Generally	 a	 court	 will	 not	 be	 concerned	with	 intelligence	 and	 in	 some	
cases	in	England	and	Wales	will	be	prevented	from	considering	it	at	all.4	
However,	 in	 some	 cases	 OSINT	 will	 potentially	 be	 helpful	 to	 parties	
either	 in	 a	 criminal	 prosecution	 or	 in	 some	 civil	 proceedings	 such	 as	
employment	 litigation,	 defamation	 or	 infringement	 of	 intellectual	










To	 illustrate	 those	 considerations	 consider	 a	 situation	 where	
investigators	 are	 inquiring	 into	 a	 robbery.	 Conducting	 OSINT	 research	
they	 find	 a	 photograph	 on	 a	 Facebook	 page	 that	 appears	 to	 have	 been	
taken	 at	 the	 time	 and	 in	 the	 location	 of	 the	 alleged	 offence.	 The	
photograph	shows	two	people,	one	of	whom	is	the	registered	user	of	the	
Facebook	 page.	 The	 photograph	 shows	 the	 two	 people,	 both	 male,	
standing	in	a	park	laughing	and	one	of	the	males	is	holding	up	what	looks	
like	 a	 handgun.	 Plainly	 this	OSINT	would	be	potentially	 relevant	 to	 the	
robbery	inquiry	for	a	whole	range	of	reasons.	In	and	of	itself	the	material	
might	be	 sufficient	 to	put	 	the	 two	men	at	 the	 scene	of	 the	offence	 and	
substantiate	 the	 grounds	 for	 their	 arrest.	 	It	 might	 also	 be	 relevant	 in	




relevance	 and	what	 purpose	 it	would	 serve.	 The	 court	would	 need,	 for	
example,	 to	 establish	 the	 facts	 in	 issue	 in	 the	 case	 and	 how	 far	 the	
Facebook	material	helped	 to	prove	any	of	 those	 facts.	 If	 the	men	 in	 the	
photograph	 admitted	 to	 having	 been	 present	 in	 that	 place	 and	 at	 that	
time	but	simply	denied	having	been	involved	in	the	robbery,	it	would	be	
of	 limited	 relevance.	 If,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 they	 denied	 having	 been	
present	 or	 even	 knowing	 each	 other,	 the	material	 would	 be	 of	 greater	
relevance.	If	there	was	dispute	about	their	whereabouts	at	the	time	and	
location	 it	might	be	possible	 to	show	not	only	 the	content	of	 the	 image	
but,	if	it	had	been	created	on	a	mobile	device,	where	and	when	the	image	
was	 made	 and	 transmitted.	 There	 might	 	be	 a	 description	 of	 the	
offenders’	 clothing	 or	 other	 matters	 of	 their	 appearance,	 words	 used	
during	the	offence	etc.,	some	of	which	could	be	corroborated	(or	indeed	








element	 in	 the	 rules	 of	 evidence	within	 England	 and	Wales	 and,	 as	we	
shall	 see	 below,	 any	 other	 state	 that	 is	 a	 signatory	 to	 the	 ECHR.	 Then	









attached	 to	 it.	 The	 greater	 the	 likelihood	 that	 the	 material	 could	 have	
been	altered	or	 interfered	with,	 the	 less	weight	 it	will	carry	even	if	 it	 is	
held	to	be	relevant.		
	
A	 further	 and	 overriding	 consideration	 in	 a	 criminal	 trial	 will	 be	 the	
fairness	 of	allowing	 the	 material	 to	 be	 adduced	 as	 evidence.	 In	 trials	
involving	 a	 jury	 it	 is	 often	 necessary	 for	 the	 judge	 to	 give	 specific	
directions	 about	 the	 evidence	 admitted,	 for	 what	 purpose(s)	 it	 can	 be	
considered	(e.g.	motive,	identity,	alibi	etc.)	and	the	limits	of	any	inference	
that	can	be	made	from	it.	Generally	material	 that	has	appeared	in	some	
open	 source	 with	 no	 reliable	 antecedents,	 with	 ready	 opportunities	 to	
interfere	 with/alter	 it	 and	 without	 anyone	 willing	 to	 testify	 to	 its	







the	 material	 has	 been	 obtained	 illegally	 or	 in	 breach	 of	 process	





In	most	 jurisdictions	with	developed	 legal	systems	the	 legal	 framework	
governing	 criminal	 proceedings	 will	 provide	 a	 defendant	 basic	
entitlements	 such	 as	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 hearing	 before	 an	 impartial	
tribunal,	a	(qualified)	right	not	to	 incriminate	him/herself7and	the	right	
to	 challenge	 any	witnesses	 testifying	 against	 him	 or	 her.	 	 	In	 countries	
that	are	signatories	to	the	ECHR	these	fundamental	entitlements	are	set	
out	 in	 Art	 6(1)	 and	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 parallels	 in	 other	 jurisdictions	
observing	the	rule	of	law.	The	legal	framework	is	considered	below.	 
The	legal	framework	governing	the	acquisition	and	use	of	OSINT	by	LEAs	
in	 	the	 UK	 is	 a	mixture	 of	 European	 and	 domestic	 law,	 some	 of	 which	
creates	 particular	 challenges	 and	 dilemmas	 for	 LEAs	 (see	 Sampson	
2015).	As	discussed	above,	the	ECHR—and	art	6(1)	in	particular—plays	
a	 central	 part	 in	 this	 framework;	 other	 jurisdictions	 beyond	 the	 47	































































prejudicial	 to	 the	 defendant	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 challenged	 and	 probably	
excluded.13	 The	 entitlement	 to	 a	 fair	 hearing	 also	 involves	 giving	 a	
defendant	 the	 proper	 opportunity	 to	 challenge	 and	 question	 a	witness	
[per	Art.	6(3)(d)]	and	that	would	 include	the	maker	of	OSINT	materials	
relied	 on	 against	 him	 or	 her.	 Many,	 if	 not	 all,	 jurisdictions	 will	 have	
specific	 rules	 about	 hearsay	 evidence	 and	 its	 admissibility.	 In	 England	
and	 Wales	 hearsay	 is	 “a	 statement	 not	 made	 in	 oral	 evidence	 in	 the	
proceedings	that	is	evidence	of	any	matter	stated”14	and	it	is	governed	by	
statute15	 which	 provides	 fairly	 wide	 gateways	 through	 which	 hearsay	
evidence	may	be	admitted.	Clearly	OSINT	documents	and	material	will,	if	
used	 as	 proof	 of	 any	 matter	 stated	 within	 them,16	 fall	 within	 this	
definition	and	 the	 statutory	 rules,	 together	with	 relevant	 guidelines	 for	
prosecutors	should	be	consulted.	
	





reasonable	degree	of	concentration”.18	 In	order	 to	 facilitate	 the	conduct	
of	the	defence,	the	defendant	must	not	be	hindered	in	obtaining	copies	of	




















Against	 that	 framework	 the	potential	evidential	uses	of	OSINT	are	vast.		
For	 example	 the	 prosecution	 may	 want	 to	 use	 the	 defendant’s	 use	 of	
certain	expressions	or	 idiosyncratic	grammar	 to	prove	 that	she	wrote	a	
particular	 sentence	 in,	 say,	 a	 case	 	of	 blackmail	 or	 harassment.	
Alternatively	 the	 state	 may	 wish	 to	 show	 that	 the	defendant	 posted	
materials	on	social	media	showing	that	they	were	at	a	certain	place	at	the	
time	of	an	offence,	that	they	were	a	member	of	a	violent	gang	or	that	they	
were	 bragging	 openly	 about	 involvement	 in	 an	 incident21	 	 	 	Of	 course	




be	 found	 in	 one	 case24	 	where	 a	 juror	 posted	 a	 grossly	 inappropriate	
Facebook	message	during	the	trial	of	an	alleged	sex	offender.	It	was	held	
that	 this	posting	of	 the	message	 amounted	 to	 a	 contempt	of	 court	 as	 it	
had	 been	 calculated	 to	 interfere	 with	 the	 proper	 administration	 of	
justice.	In	that	case	the	defendant	had	used	his	smart	phone	to	send	the	
message	 when	 travelling	 home	 on	 a	 bus25	 and	 the	 message	 itself	 was	
direct	 evidence	 of	 the	 offence	 itself.	 Alternatively	 such	 material	 might	
include	a	recording	made	by	a	witness	on	their	mobile	phone	and	posted	















of	 a	 phone	 to	 undermine	 evidence	 of	 alibi.	  However,	 much	 OSINT	
material	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 directly	 probative	 of	 an	 offence	 and	 is	more	
likely	to	be	relied	on	by	way	of	background	or	contextual	information	or	
to	 corroborate/contradict	 a	 specific	 fact	 in	 issue.	 In	 addition	 it	may	 be	
the	 defendant	who	wishes	 to	 rely	 on	 OSINT,	 for	 instance	 to	 show	 that	
unsolicited	 pictures	 had	 been	 submitted	 by	 a	 complainant	 on	 his	
Facebook	page.26	In	such	cases	the	same	evidential	principles	will	apply.		
While	these	same	principles	can	apply	within	the	context	of	related	civil	





Finally,	 although	 OSINT	 is,	 by	 its	 nature,	 generally	 put	 into	 the	 public	
domain	 y	 others	without	 the	 involvement	 of	 an	 LEA,	 investigators	will	
need	 to	 be	 very	 cautious	 about	 any	 activity	 that	 me	 be	 regarded	 as	
encouraging	 or	 inciting	 the	 commission	 of	 an	 offence27	 and	 must	 not	
breach	any	laid	down	processes	for	accessing	data.28	As	discussed	above	
if	 the	 material	 has	 been	 has	 been	 obtained	 unlawfully	 there	 will	 be	


















same	 forensic	 standards	 and	 clear	 the	 same	 legal	 hurdles	 as	 any	 other	






















































































































































“The ATHENA Equation – Balancing the Efficacy of Citizens’ Response to 
Emergency with the Reality of Citizens’ Rights.” in The Police Journal: 








The ATHENA Equation - Balancing the Efficacy of Citizens’ Response with the 
Reality of Citizens’ Rights around Data Protection 
 
Introduction 
The impact of social media on emergency management has been substantial (see e.g. 
Crowe 2010) and its “growing ubiquity, not only in geopolitical, economic and business 
spheres, but also in official responsiveness to crisis and disaster” has been well-
documented (Akhgar et al. 2013). Until now, that impact has largely involved the relevant 
LEA and other bodies utilising the available networks as another source of mass 
communication in the prosecution of their ordinary tasks such as controlling public disorder 
and detecting/preventing crime (Coptich and Fox 2010).  The ways and extent to which 
LEAs and other crisis responders might possibly harness new communication media - 
particularly web-based social media such as Twitter and Facebook, and the prolific use of 
high-tech mobile devices - to provide efficient and effective communication and enhanced 
situational awareness during a crisis is being explored by Sheffield Hallam University’s EC-
funded ATHENA project.  
 
 ATHENA’s approach to crisis management emphasises and centres upon the necessity of 
effective responders to adjust their actions to the unfolding situation.  Its underlying 
premise is that: 
 
The public are under-utilized crisis responders; they are often first on the scene, vastly 
outnumber the emergency first responders and are creative and resourceful. In a crisis, the 
public self-organise into voluntary groups, adapt quickly to changing circumstances, 
emerge as leaders and experts and perform countless life-saving actions; and they are 
increasingly reliant upon the use of new communications media to do it. ATHENA will help 
them by joining their conversations and adding an enabling voice. ATHENA will give them 
the information they ask for, in a way they can understand. ATHENA will assist them in 




32 ATHENA Master Document SJY Para B.1.1.1 
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In striving to meet this general objective, ATHENA is seeking to create and deploy two 
technical outputs: an ‘app’ and the information dashboard.  The app envisages the person 
finding themselves at the centre of the relevant crisis situation as a ‘citizen reporter’ 
providing valuable, real time data to the responders while the dashboard provides a source 













These twin products are intended to deliver major enablers that will encourage users of 
new media to contribute to the security of ‘citizens in crisis situations’ by designing a set of 
best practice guidelines for law enforcement agencies (LEAs), first responders and citizens 
for the use of new media.  
	 136	
 
In pursuing its objectives ATHENA will necessarily create a complex series of legal 
relationships: relationships between contributors inter se, between contributors and the 
State, and also between contributors and their communications service providers, their 
employers, third sector crisis responders, potential litigants in criminal or civil proceedings, 
news media broadcasters etc.  These relationships will be potentially problematic unless 
appropriately identified and catered for right from the start.  Further, if there is to be 
additional realisation of intellectual property rights within the products and outputs it will be 
critical for ATHENA to have addressed all relevant legal issues arising from the creation of 




ATHENA recognises the existence and importance of legal considerations relating to 
privacy and data protection33; what follows is intended to assist in that task and the 
research that will flow from it.  By helping to formulate the requisite ethical and legal 
framework required of ATHENA, this article will also aim to provide a useful platform for 
discussion of any future initiatives of this type. 
 
 
ATHENA: Understanding its Constituent  Elements  
The various elements of social media constituting the ATHENA approach to aiding citizens 
and LEAs in response to social crises may usefully be understood in terms of the process 
of stoichiometry.   Stoichiometry is an activity (or exercise) involving the close analysis of 
the different relationships between relative quantities of elements taking part in a chemical 
reaction and is almost a perfect metaphor for the legal issues arising in ATHENA.  The 
social reactions caused by ‘crises’ of the type envisaged by ATHENA (particularly where 
there is an investigative or criminal justice element) create legal relationships between the 
parties and agencies involved and arguably require an appropriate legal equation 
balancing, on the one hand, the efficacy of a collective response and, on the other, the 
observance of privacy and legal compliance around data protection.   
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ATHENA utilisises Kaplan and Haenlein’s (2010) six principal varieties of social media: 
 
• collaborative projects (e.g. Wikipedia);  
• blogs and microblogs(e.g. Twitter);  
• content communities (e.g. YouTube);  
• social networking sites (e.g. Facebook);  
• virtual game worlds (e.g. World of Warcraft); and 
• virtual social worlds (e.g. Second Life).  
 
ATHENA looks at these media in four contextual crisis settings – public disorder, terrorism, 
acute threats to public health stemming from outbreaks of infectious disease/pandemics 
and natural disasters. The reactive communications of citizens caught in crisis already go 
way beyond the passive, information-consuming audience that the police (see, for 
example, Crump 2011) and press have previously been used to encountering.  ATHENA 
seeks to invite those same citizens into a network of potentially limitless operational data.   
 
West Yorkshire for Innovation (WyFi)34 are leading the coordination of ATHENA which, in 
essence, is a 3 year, €5million project funded by the European Commission. Approved by 
the Chief Constable in 2011, ATHENA tackles the question of how the huge popularity of 
new smart mobile communications through social media can be harnessed to provide 
efficient and effective communication and enhanced situational awareness during a crisis 
for citizens and emergency responders.  In terms of technical output, ATHENA will deliver 
two:  
1. a set of best practice guidelines for emergency responders and citizens in the use of new 
and emerging communications media, tools and technologies during crisis situations and  
2. a suite of prototype software tools (the ATHENA ‘system’ including the ATHENA ‘app’, and 
a command and control dashboard for multi-agency incident rooms).  
 
From December 2013 to November 2016, ATHENA will seek to create a fundamental and 
permanent shift in the way crisis situations are managed by LEAs and other statutory first 
responders. ATHENA will ensure: 
a) that citizens are connected and better protected during crisis;  
	
34 part of the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for West Yorkshire 
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b) the smarter use of police resources and technology; 
c) that commanders and key decision makers have increased visibility of online 
activity enhancing their situational awareness of dynamically unfolding events;  
d) that crises are better managed and resolved effectively, aiding swifter recovery 
and return to a state of ‘normality’.  
 
In achieving this, WyFi are leading a global consortium of 14 partners across the EU and in 
the US.  The ATHENA project team consists of 26 professionals from partners including 
Harvard University and Blackberry. ATHENA provides €680k to WyFi to manage and 
deliver the project. There exists substantial future revenue potential for the post-project 
delivery and licensing of the ATHENA ‘system’ and ‘app’ to a global market.  
 
In taking part in the ‘reaction’ to civil contingency and accepting the ‘invitation’ held out by 
the outputs (the app and the dashboard) citizens as elements will find themselves in legal 
relationships - both direct and vicarious – which are likely to prove operationally 
hazardous.  ATHENA is therefore under a profound obligation to ensure that such 
relationships, their possible implications and consequences, are adequately considered 
and catered for in the project.  The key issues to be included in this discussion are now 
explored in the following section which, for the purposes of brevity and illustration, are 
focused primarily on one of the major forms of crisis episode addressed by ATHENA: that 
of large-scale public disorder. 
 
 
Understanding the legal relationships 
Any consideration of the legal relationships arising from ATHENA needs to begin with the 
overarching regulatory framework governing data in the UK.  The general protection, 
processing, sharing and retention of data in the UK is heavily regulated by a mixture of 
European and domestic law, some of which creates particular challenges and dilemmas for 
LEAs (see Sampson 2015).  A detailed exposition of the relationship between these two 
areas of jurisprudence – EU and domestic – was set out by the Supreme Court in the 
context of data access and journalism (see Kennedy v The Charity Commission [2014] 
UKSC 2035). 
	
35 See also Osborn v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 6; R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State 
for Transport [2014] UKSC 3; R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] AC 601.  
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All questions arising from the retention and processing of data across LEAs of member 
states involved in ATHENA must demonstrate compliance with that legal framework and 
take account, not only of the relevant domestic legislation (i.e. the the Data Protection Act 
1998, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 in 
the UK) but also that of the European Union and decisions of the relevant tribunals. 
The law relating to data protection across the EU derives from wider constructs of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.  In crude summary, there are two “distinct but related 
systems” protecting fundamental and human rights in Europe (see Kokott & Sobotta 2013).  
The first of these is the European Convention on Human Rights, an international 
agreement between the States of the Council of Europe36).  Convention matters are 
ultimately justiciable in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  The Convention 
treats the protection of personal data as an extension of the broader right to privacy (Article 
8 incorporates this with reference to an individual's private and family life, home and 
correspondence)37.  Interference by a member state (e.g. by the police) with the rights of 
an individual under the Convention must be “necessary in a democratic society” and have 
a legitimate aim to answer a “pressing social need"; they must also be proportionate38. The 
second system of protection is found in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which 
enshrines data protection as a fundamental right in itself (also Article 8).  This right is 
distinct from the protection of respect for private and family (Article 7) and is the province 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ).  Both systems converge at the point 
where activities – particularly those of the State - involve data capture, retention and 
analysis; non-compliance will create causes of action for individuals whose rights have 
been infringed.   Thus both elements of EU jurisprudence are potentially engaged by 
ATHENA’s activities one key practical element of which is that of purpose. 
Another important principle, that of ‘purpose limitation’, is a fundamental data protection 
mechanism39 found in both the Convention on Human Rights and the Charter.  This 
principle exists in order to achieve a balance between protection of data subjects’ rights 
against the necessary activities of data controllers by setting limits on how the data 
	
36 Along with others e.g. Switzerland, Russia, and Turkey 
37 Article 8 prohibits interference with the right to privacy except where such interference is in accordance 
with the generally applicable departures from the Convention article necessary in a democratic society.  See 
Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom (no 4158/05/2010) 
38 see Coster v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 479) 
39 See Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 95/46/EC - of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24.10.1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (OJ L 281,23.11.1995, p. 31) 
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controllers are able to use their data. Purpose limitation has two components the first of 
which is purpose specification. Purpose limitation requires the collection and processing of 
certain types of data such as ‘personal data’40 to be carried out fairly for a 'specified, 
explicit and legitimate' purpose (purpose specification). It also means that the data must 
not be further processed in a way that is incompatible with the specified purpose(s); 
compatible use is the second component.  The nature of the relationship between the 
controller and the data subject is critical when assessing use compatibility: any 
compatibility assessment will need to be more stringent if the data subject was not given 
sufficient freedom of choice at the point of data collection and arguably if there was a clear 
‘inequality of arms’41 between the State and the citizen at the point of the relationship’s 
creation.  
Addressing this element of informed choice and volitional acceptance will be essential for 
ATHENA, particularly where there are four different contexts envisaged by those recruiting 
the help (and data) of citizens.  If relevant personal data is to be collected and retained 
lawfully by the agencies involved in ATHENA then key areas such as informed consent 
and compatible purpose will have to be addressed.  To see why, it is helpful to look at the 
development of the legal regulatory framework around data retention.  
On 8 April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) held that the EU’s own 
legislation (the Data Retention Directive, the principal instrument for personal data 
retention in member states)42 was itself incompatible with various rights of the individual as 
it permitted data to be retained in a manner that allowed the identity of the person to be 
revealed, in addition to identifying the time of the communication and the place from which 
that communication took place43.  The Directive sought to ensure that data were available 
to prevent, investigate, detect and prosecute serious crimes and providers of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks were 
obliged the relevant data.  The ECJ held that those data were capable of permitting “very 
precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data 
has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life … daily or other movements, the 
activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons and the social environments 
	
40 personal data in England and Wales means data relating to an identified/identifiable living individual – Data 
Protection Act 1998  
41 Equality of arms stricto sensu only arises in matters affecting the individual’s right under Art 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights to a fair trial but the jurisprudential concept is a useful simile here.  
42 EU Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC 
43 Judgment in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and 
Seitlinger and Others  
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frequented by them".  It followed that their close, effective and certain regulation was of 
fundamental importance to the protection of the individual.   
 
The response from within the UK was swift and controversial: Parliament enacted the 
Retention of Data and Investigative Powers Act 2014 which amends the principal statute44, 
strengthening the requirements for a national security element and introducing a ministerial 
power to require communications companies to retain data.  While this highly contentious 
legislative response has a built-in shelf life (by virtue of a ‘sunset clause’ – see s.8 (3)45) 
the Government has also introduced a permanent response in the form of an equally 
controversial Data Communications Bill46 which, at the time of writing, had the potential to 
be brought into force before the General Election in May 2015)47.  The ECJ also held that 
the retention of data might have a “chilling effect” on the use of electronic communication 
covered by the Directive on the exercise of freedom of expression guaranteed by Art 11 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights48.  
 
This is of substantial importance when read against the type of data collection and 
retention envisaged by ATHENA.  While the principal focus of ATHENA is to provide first 
responders to crises with invaluable data that empowers them to tackle the immediate 
risks and threats, those same data may be critical to any subsequent investigation of 
criminal offences, of individuals caught up in the crises and of intelligence compilation 
generally.  Against the broader juridical backdrop set out supra, the police record on data 
management in the UK underscores the importance of ATHENA getting this right.  
Although there may not be an express intention to retain personal data captured by/from 
participating citizens in ATHENA, several successful legal challenges (see infra) to the way 
in which the police have used and retained personal data illustrate the tensions between 
processing personal data for immediate use in detecting and preventing crime and the 
retention of such data on the basis of its potential value in future 
investigations/prosecutions.  
	
44 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
45 i.e. the legislation effectively repeals itself at the end of the calendar year (see ss. 1-7 and the provisions 
inserted into the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by sections 3 to 6)  




47 In the event it was postponed and reappeared as a different bill in the Queen’s Speech May 2015. 
48 For a fuller explanation see Boehm & Cole (2013)  
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The perennial public interest dichotomy for LEAs was well captured by Lord Bingham in a 
case involving more general police powers over two decades ago: 
 
“There is, first of all, a public interest in the effective investigation and prosecution of crime. 
Secondly, there is a public interest in protecting the personal and property rights of citizens 
against infringement and invasion. There is an obvious tension between these two public 
interests because crime could be most effectively investigated and prosecuted if the 
personal and property rights of citizens could be freely overridden and total protection of 
the personal and property rights of citizens would make investigation and 
prosecution of many crimes impossible or virtually so”.49 
 
This dilemma has clearly become more challenging with the arrival and development of Big 
Data capabilities (see Sampson loc cit) and is possibly at its most acute in the field of the 
retention of personal data. In one of the examples referred to supra, S & Marper v United 
Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581, the police retention of DNA samples of individuals arrested, 
but later acquitted or had the charges against them dropped, was held to be a violation of 
the data subject’s right to privacy). In another (R (on the application of GC & C) v The 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21) data subjects successfully 
challenged the policy of the Association of Chief Police Officers allowing indefinite 
retention of biometric samples, DNA and fingerprints, save in exceptional circumstances).   
 
Conversely, the failings of the police in England and Wales to retain relevant personal data 
in a searchable shared way so as to enable the tracking of dangerous offenders such as 
Ian Huntley50 were widely reported and criticised in the Bichard Report51 leading to 
wholesale changes in the police approach to operational IT capabilities.  Data processing 
can all too easily be casually cast as mere ‘bureaucratic’ compliance52 and public and 
political tolerance of administrative niceties when faced with preventable criminality can be 
expected to be unforgiving of the LEAs involved. However, the link between police 
	
49 R v Lewes Crown Court ex parte Hill (1991) 93 Cr App R 60, at 65-66 
50 Convicted on 17 December 2003 of the murder of 10 year old schoolgirls Holly Wells and Jessica 
Chapman 
51 Report of the Bichard Inquiry HC 653 22 June 2004, The Stationery Office, London 
52 see e.g. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-449456/Paper-tigers-lunatic-bureaucracy-crippling-
police.html 
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legitimacy and trust of their communities – particularly when it comes to use of intrusive 
powers and data processing – is too significant for ATHENA to ignore53. 
 
Should an LEA acquire personal data in the course of an ATHENA-related crisis (say, a 
civil contingency such as a flood) that will be potentially relevant to the investigation of 
subsequent criminal investigation (offences of looting) the temptation (or arguably 
obligation) for those agencies to retain those data beyond the time of the exigencies of the 
rescue/responder requirement, will often be irresistible.  ATHENA-based data can – and in 
fact are designed to – produce specificity in key elements such as the time, identity and 
location of the contributor.  While the value of such data in the course of the combined 
effort to neutralize the threat, risk and harm of the presenting crisis is self-evident, so too is 
the correlative value of those data to other – perhaps unrelated – investigations or simply 
intelligence.  How far the participants can be taken to have consented to the retention and 
use of their personal data for divergent purposes will be important within the legal 
framework and ought, therefore, to be addressed at the point of recruiting ATHENA 
citizens.  
 
Moreover, ATHENA is planning to go much further.   For example, not only is it planning to 
analyse geotags to show where individuals were at the relevant time(s), or word collocation 
(where the frequency of occurrence of pairs or groups of words occurring in proximity is 
determined (Smadja 1993; Lin 1998; Seretan et al. 2003); the team is going to “move the 
semantic analysis of social media data beyond current state of the art”.  The project will 
use automated processes to conduct sentiment analyses to locate and analyse digital 
content in real time to determine the contributor’s “emotional meaning”, developing 
“credibility assessments” and “scoring tools” to underpin the use of ATHENA data mining, 
social network and sentiment analysis tools to tag messages with reliability scores54. 
 
The importance of clarity and informed consent is underscored by the wider relationships 
between the police and the policed.  In addition to the legal challenges already identified, 
the police have also suffered the ignominy of having their official recognition removed by 
the Office for National Statistics because their data processing approaches for recording 
	
53 See e.g. Hough et al. (2010); Bradford et al (2012); Stanko (2011). 
54 see ATHENA submission Sentiment and reliability analysis - B.1.1.1 
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crime were found to be unreliable.55  More recently, a report of HM Inspector of 
Constabulary into the reliability of crime recording data created and maintained by the 
police forces of England and Wales56.  Their interim report published on 1 May 2014 
referred to the Inspectorate’s “serious concerns” in the integrity of police crime recording 
data.  ATHENA will need to address these issues head on, not only in order to ensure legal 
compliance, but also because the project relies heavily on citizens’ trust and confidence in 
the relevant State systems.  Shortcomings in data quality and reliability in the particular 
context of LEAs can have real and immediate detrimental impacts on and within the 
criminal justice process57. The arrangements for holding LEAs and other bodies to account 
over their use of data collection and processing activities in an investigatory context have 
also attracted criticism58.  
 
Taken together with a degree of global mistrust of state use (and abuse) of personal data59 
and the development of what some have seen as a pervasive “omniveillance” made 
possible by Big Data (see Blackman 2008; Armstrong et al. 2013), the need to ensure 
transparency and legitimacy at all stages ought to be a cornerstone of ATHENA in all its 
settings.  
 
In addition, other criminal justice services - such as those offered to victims of crime 
extended in compliance with the Victims’ Code60 in accordance with published guidance 
from the Office of the Information Commissioner61 - are beginning to focus on the data 
control and sharing arrangements.  It is therefore probably time that data control protocols 
were built in to all State agencies’ policies as a standard.  
 
	
55 See also “Caught Red Handed” - Report of the Public Administration Select Committee 13th session 2013/14 
HC 760, The Stationery Office, London  
56 http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/programmes/crime-data-integrity/.   
57 see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11117598/Criminals-could-appeal-after-Home-
Office-admits-potentially-misleading-DNA-evidence-presented-to-juries.html 
58	(see, for example, the decision of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 5 December 2014, determining that 
the manner in which the US intelligence services supplied intercepted communications to the UK intelligence 
services, 
 and the latter's operation of the regime under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s.8(4) was 
lawful and human rights-compliant -Liberty (National Council for Civil Liberties) & Ors v Government 
Communications HQ & Ors (2014) IPT 13/77/H). 
 
59 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files  




Although having a particular LEA frame of reference, in some respects the legal data 
considerations created by ATHENA reactions are similar to those affecting commercial 
relationships (Searls 2012), making the “customer” a fully empowered actor in the market 
place, rather than one whose power is entirely dependent on exclusive relationships – in 
this case with the State and its agencies rather than commercial vendors - particularly if 
those relationships are based on coerced agreement.  However, a photo—sharing policy 
for a non-investigative agency appears relatively simple and very different from sharing 
with LEAs that have investigatory duties, powers and processes62.  
 
One suggestion for how to manage the specific LEA-based stoichiometry of ATHENA 
would be to borrow from the commercial sector and create an End User Agreement 
Licence (EUAL) between ATHENA participants and the LEAs/State agencies in receipt of 
the data.  Following the same principles as those being promoted in the context of 
commercial data exchange such an EUAL would make ATHENA transactions 
“bidirectional” (per Lanier 2013). It is submitted as part of this proposal that ATHENA 
needs to establish, if not a pure “intention economy” (per Searls op cit) in this regard, then 
at least an expressly consensual one.   
 
The importance of having such an agreement or protocol will now be underlined with 
specific reference to ATHENA’s potential role in relation to major instances of public 
disorder. 
   
Understanding the reaction 
Much of the relevant data that will be captured, processed and retained by ATHENA in this 
context emanates from social media.  There has been some significant research in the 
realm of social media and the policing of disorder generally, mostly focusing on the role 
played by communication in the mobilisation of disorder and coordination of participants 
(see e.g. Kotronaki and Seferiades 2012; Russell 2007 - French and Grecian riots of 2005 
	
62 For examples see International Committee of the Red 
Cross(ICRC)http://www.flickr.com/photos/ifrc/sets/72157623207618658/ 
Maple Bluff [Wisconsin] Fire Department: http://picasaweb.google.com/MapleBluffFireDepartment 






and 2008 respectively - and Kavanaugh et al. 2011; Papic and Noonan 2011; Xiguang and 
Jing 2010 – riots and disorder around the so-called ‘Arab Spring’).  There is also formal 
guidance for the police (NPIA 2010) though this gives no specific advice on personal data 
protection and compliance of the type being described here.   
 
The relationship between public disorder and the State use of social media has largely 
developed around the possibility of governments using their powers to censor or curtail 
communication as a means of suppression (e.g. Casilli and Tubaro 2012; Howard et al. 
2011)).  However, the advances being offered by ATHENA intend to shift this and make 
the use of social media by public disorder responders a central tactical and strategic plank.   
 
ATHENA considers South Yorkshire Police's social media strategy during protests around 
the Liberal Democrats' 2011 Spring Conference in Sheffield (McSeveny and Waddington 
2011) and the force’s use of Twitter and Facebook to interact with members of the public.  
ATHENA contrasts the police use of social media during the TUC's 'March for the 
Alternative' in 2011 which received praise from independent observers (Liberty 2011) but 
also criticism on the basis that the police seemed more concerned with managing public 
perception than facilitating communication, causing mistrust and unrest (Netpol 2011).  
They also compare the strategies of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and Greater 
Manchester Police (GMP) during the riots of 2011 highlighting the “relative success” of 
GMP's more 'expressive' approach compared to that of the MPS’s 'instrumental' strategy 
(Denef et al. 2013; Procter et al. 2013).  ATHENA tracks how British police forces not only 
saw a tremendous growth in the number of Twitter followers but how they also, for the first 
time, engaged with the public on a large scale via social media, using Twitter as the main 
platform' (Denef et al., op cit.).  
 
ATHENA notes the work of researchers who found that the MPS’s use of social media was 
hampered by the lack of a coherent social media strategy and of appropriate resources, 
failing to take advantage of the increasing number of people who - as events unfolded - 
followed the police on Twitter, creating a growing capacity for communicating risk and 
communicating about risk (Procter et al., 2013).  These authors observed varied 
approaches between the two police forces, citing one Metropolitan Police officer who 
concluded they had not been  “wholly up to speed in using social media as an intelligence 
tool, an investigative tool and most importantly as an engagement tool” (ibid., p. 21).  By 
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contrast, Greater Manchester Police were congratulated on the way that they had chosen 
to use such media during the riots (ibid.). 
 
While Manchester was less affected by the riots, their local police force had already 
established a reputation for embracing Twitter and had experimented with its use in 
campaigns before and ATHENA contrasts how the two forces had made use of social 
media during the disturbances.  For example, during the period from 4-13 August, the MPS 
posted 132 tweets, but GMP almost three times as many (a total of 371). Beyond the 
quantitative difference there was also significant qualitative variation within the content and 
style of messages.  The MPS’s clear preference for using a much more impersonal style, 
directed to a generic audience as opposed to individual followers.  While both forces 
employed Twitter primarily to gather and disseminate information about the riots (e.g. by 
posting CCTV images of perpetrators on Flickr and leaving phone numbers and website 
addresses) GMP placed a much greater emphasis on reassuring the public - i.e. 'noting 
that everything was calm and the public should not worry'.  The MPS, by contrast, focused 
principally on maintaining law and order illustrating how one force’s approach followed an 
instrumental strategy while the other’s was primarily expressive. 
 
Relying on other research (e.g. Denef et al. op cit.) ATHENA63 explores how GMP's 
commitment to engaging with their followers involved an immediate response to rumours 
(e.g. reacting to online suggestions that the nationwide riots were spreading into 
Manchester and having their officers of commenting directly on news reports) in a way that 
elicited direct personal queries submitted by followers and even remaining sensitive to the 
feelings and opinions of its followers (on one occasion, expressly apologising for a police 
Tweet that had been criticised for appearing to celebrate the length of a prison sentence 
subsequently handed down to a looter).  The much more utilitarian approach adopted by 
the MPS contrasts quite starkly and almost seems to represent – at the time of the 
research – a conventional LEA communications strategy delivered via a new medium.  
Clearly ATHENA aims to inculcate a strategy – and encourage the attendant relationships 
between LEAs and crisis responders – based upon a qualitative shift that embraces the 
informal colloquy around which it has evolved. 
	





While undoubtedly apprehending an innovative and sophisticated approach to social media 
by LEAs, the plans by ATHENA to exceed anything that has previously been done with the 
data generated by crisis relationships will need to be drawn to the attention of any crisis 
responder; arguably it needs to be publicised to communities at large.  In other words, they 
too will be well advised to adopt an expressive strategy before drawing upon the vast 
social media capacity and taking on the reactivity of digital live-time communications.  The 
parameters of their ‘compatible purposes’ will be particularly important in the setting of 
public disorder where protracted investigative process usually follows the settling of the 
dust.  Criminal investigations can continue for months or even years beyond the 
emergency itself and the availability of relevant responders’ data to be analysed, retained 
and shared with other agencies raises substantial legal issues, particularly where that data 
might be used for purposes that are adverse to the responder’s individual interests.  It is 
recommended that ATHENA makes explicit any likelihood that responders’ data may be 
used for criminal intelligence, investigation and even prosecution purposes.  Further legal 
issues arise in the case of political protest where LEAs are often as interested in upstream 
prevention as they are in real time responding (see for example the legal issues and 
criticisms of police action in R (on the application of Laporte) v Chief Constable of 
Gloucestershire [2006] UKHL 55)64. 
 
The proposals in ATHENA expect individuals voluntarily to become contributors of ‘open 
source’ intelligence, not just in the way the researchers looking at riots and public disorder 
have described (supra) but as active agents of the responders65.   Once they agree to do 
so these contributors need to be mindful that the enduring utility of their data retained is 
incongruous with the evanescent, situation-specific relationships created by crises.  The 
very transient nature of digital relationships that coalesce around an event such as a public 
disturbance can be seen from analyses of social media patters such as Twitter (see Fig 2), 
whereby once the event/activity/interest that unites members diminishes, so does the 
digital “community” itself (see Beguerisse-Díaz et al. 2014; also Bruns & Burgess 2012).  In 
light of this, it is proposed that ATHENA takes account of, and prepares for the 
retention/deletion of relevant data once the uniting crisis (or at least an agreed phase of it) 
	
64 where it was held that the police action to prevent the applicant travelling from Gloucestershire to an anti-
war rally in London interfered disproportionately and therefore unlawfully with the applicant’s Convention 
rights of freedom of expression and assembly    
65 Quaere whether the data of citizens acting in this capacity can properly be regarded as open source? 
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has passed.  ATHENA might also ask themselves whether the informed consent of 
responders should be contingent upon the continued existence of the emergency and how 








Fig 3 Graphic from Beguerisse-Díaz et al. (op cit.) conflating 15 interest communities 
of the “most influential Twitter users” during the 2011 riots in London. 
 
 
Where disorder emanates from political protest, the challenges for LEAs increase - and so 
they will for ATHENA.  ATHENA has analysed a number of scenarios including the 50,000-
strong march through central London in November 2010 by students protesting against a 
rise in their tuition fees and the conclusions drawn by researchers (Stott et al., 2010) and 
also the experiences elsewhere (Poell and Borra 2011 and Earl et al. 2013). They also 
considered the use of social media to create ‘flash-mobs’ with thousands directed to riot 
hotspots such as Millbank (Loveys 2010).  The volume of social media interaction and the 
generation of attendant relationships from another episode of disorder in London disorder 
illustrates the size of the task (some 2.6 million tweets posted from approximately 700,000 
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distinct user accounts between 1pm on 6 August and 8pm on 17 August 2011 - see 
Procter et al. 2013a, 2013b).  
 
In these settings the tactics of the police have produced a series of legal challenges and 
demonstrate how difficult it is to achieve the fine balance between the obligations of the 
State to ensure the security and safety of its citizens and its duty to ensure the protection 
of their human rights and fundamental freedoms66.  Catt (loc cit) involved, in simple terms, 
the concatenation of a lawful demonstration by citizens and the indefinite retention of 
personal data about the applicant by the police on the National Domestic Extremism 
Database.  The case illustrates how, even where the relevant event takes place in public, 
the recording and retention of personal data about individuals involved can nevertheless 
amount to an unlawful interference with the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights. The importance of retaining/regaining the holy 
trinity of trust, confidence and legitimacy for LEAs and their citizens is nowhere clearer 
perhaps than where the public disorder has a political complexion and covert tactics have 
been deployed.67   
These settings also raise the very real prospect of criminal proceedings or other coercive 
uses for the ATHENA responders’ data, raising questions around non-consensual 
production of material and the extent to which any consent - express, implied, direct, 
vicarious and/or contingent – can be overridden by the relevant LEA, along with offenders’ 
use of networks and mobile communication services to organize themselves68. While there 
is not room to rehearse here the scope of police powers in obtaining such material, it is 
certainly worth ATHENA explaining the parameters to putative responders and the extent 
to which they are surrendering ownership and control of their images, texts etc. by 
participating. 
If (as is not uncommon69) the responders’ material is used for journalistic purposes it 
attracts special statutory treatment in England and Wales (Sampson 2015).   While 
material created by citizens acting alone qua citizens would probably not be protected by 
	
66 see e.g. R (on the application of Catt) v The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland and The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2013] EWCA Civ 192. 
67 (see http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/crime/article3306515.ece 
also https://netpol.org/2014/05/19/netpol-ico-complaint/). 
68 even leading to a discussion on governments shutting off Twitter and censoring social media 
communication as a means of quashing protest and disorder ((Denef et al., 2013; Casilli and Tubaro, 2012; 
Howard et al., 2011) 
69 see e.g. Reynolds & Seeger (2012); Gillmor (2008); Greer (2010); Poell & Borra (2011); Russell (2007) 
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the usual statutory provisions enjoyed in England and Wales by journalists70 (despite the 
ATHENA app’s nomenclature of “Citizen Reporter”) and is unlikely to abide by the 
strictures of journalists rules for gathering and contributing material71, material that they 
have shared at any stage with journalists generally might.  Once this happens, the issues 
of compulsory disclosure to LEAs and prosecuting agencies become highly sensitive and 
potentially very difficult and are likely to involve questions of the journalist’s substantive 
rights72.  All of these legal relationship issues – and the methodology that relies as much 
on individual identifiable devices as much as identifiable individuals73 - should be 
addressed by ATHENA, at least as part of its Public Awareness Plan74 and arguably in the 
form of a free-standing protocol or agreement. 
 
Finally, there may be difficult legal issues if data relationships are created between the 
State and its agencies and foreign nationals who become citizen responders for ATHENA.  
The prospect of sharing personal data across jurisdictions – both inside the EU and 
European Economic Area – and beyond is a challenging consideration in achieving the 
right balance within the stoichiometry of ATHENA, particularly as there is no Big Data 
equivalent of the international law concept of non-refoulement; the prospect of compelling 
such data sharing is even more so.  
 
Conclusion 





70 See the Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ss. 11 and 13 
71 See the Journalists’ Code published by the National Union of Journalists  
https://www.nuj.org.uk/about/nuj-code/; see also Clause 47 of the Deregulation Bill. 
72 R (on the application of British Sky Broadcasting Ltd.) v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
[2014] UKSC 17.  
73 Along with associated capture, storage and processing issues such as ownership of personal devices and 
the additional personal data they might contain; what of borrowed or corporate devices? What of 
demonstrations against the commercial interests of one corporate entity and the responder is an employee? 
See too http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/15/-sp-secret-us-cybersecurity-report-encryption-
protect-data-cameron-paris-attacks 
74 per Task 9.4 
75  (including FP7 projects: Odyssey, CUBIST, DIADEM, and INDIGO and other security agency funded 
projects such as C-BML (NATO), ‘Communicating in Crisis’ (FBI), ‘Community Resilience/Shielding for the 






Public trust is arguably a sine qua non of any public engagement in the way envisaged - 
and indeed relied upon - by ATHENA.   Any generally applicable issues of public trust 
around crises76 are clearly made more acute by the involvement of LEAs who have 
coercive and intrusive powers.  As such, an obvious caveat to ATHENA in this regard is 
that the remote utilisation of private social relationships forged by the reactions to crisis 
comes, if not to be used, then at least to be suspected by communities as another form of 
surveillance.   
 
Given that the Council of Europe has expressed deep concerns on the legal implications of 
mass surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden and the correlative unlawful State use of 
personal data accumulated by private businesses77, and given too that the Council has 
concluded that mass surveillance by LEAs has been ineffective in preventing terrorism78 
(one of the ATHENA contexts) it would be wise for ATHENA expressly to disavow any 
general surveillance purpose at the outset and to provide undertakings in relation to the 
further processing of personal data.  Given also the concerns over State surveillance of 
public areas more generally79 and the ongoing controversy around statutory powers for 
state interception of data and intrusive tactics80 would be wise to address the very real risk 
that LEA usage of ATHENA Big Data might be seen as an extension of State surveillance - 
and a covert, unregulated one at that.   
	
76 For a discussion of the public’s pre- and post-disaster trust of social media, engagement during disasters 
and behaviour and attitude change see Jin & National Liu (2010); Murdogh (2009); see also Hagar (2013) 
77	Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Draft Resolution and Recommendation 
adopted 26 Jan 2015 
78 Council of Europe Resolution 2031 (2015) Terrorist attacks in Paris: together for a democratic response 
para 14.2. 
79 see Council of Europe Doc. 11692 21 July 2008 Video surveillance of public areas Recommendation 
1830 (2008) Reply from the Committee of Ministers adopted at the 1032nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies 
(9 July 2008).  




ATHENA aims ambitiously and pragmatically to harness the 'collective problem solving' 
(Palen 2008; Palen et al. 2009; Vieweg et al. 2008) of citizens using social media while, at 
the same time, developing “Europe-wide and internationally transferable guidelines for 
protocols, systems, technologies, techniques and good practice in the use of new 
communication media by the public to increase the security of citizens in crisis 
situations”81.   If this civically responsive and responsible project is to succeed, those 
‘guidelines’ must necessarily include a clear data protocol (possibly in the form of an end 
user licensing agreement) to protect the security of citizens’ personal data, identities and 
privacy and to safeguard the relationships that are critical to ATHENA’s scalability.  If there 
was ever any doubt about the potency of emerging ‘citizen journalism’ then the case of 
officer Michael Slager82 surely removed it.  The video footage of that police shooting in 
South Carolina acquired an authority and achieved a circulation to equal any establish 
news media agency and the substantial overlap between citizen journalism and 
conventional news data capture should be at the forefront of the minds of the ATHENA 
team and their putative responders.    
Howsoever they approach the issues of legal relationships and the attendant data 
considerations, ATHENA would do well to revisit the contentious Draft Communications 
Data Bill83 in which the Home Secretary describes the government’s commitment “to 
ensuring that …we strike the right balance between protecting the public and safeguarding 
civil liberties”.  This commitment to achieving equilibrium in the social reactions envisaged 
by ATHENA should be demonstrably present throughout the project, otherwise the vital 
and complex legal relationships formed and fostered by the team may become unstable 
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While the forms of accountability may differ, all policing must be 
accountable. This includes: 
i) Individual officers within the police   
ii) Public police   
iii) Transnational police (whether convened on a permanent or 
temporary basis)   
iv) Private police 
v) Mixed public / private police  


























































i) If officers are not subject to the oversight body in the area 
where the actions took place and also unaccountable to their 
‘home’ oversight body as the actions took place elsewhere.  
ii) If information is or cannot be shared between the oversight 
body or force in the other locale with the ‘home’ oversight 
body or vice versa 
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iii) If the ‘home’ oversight body cannot compel the police from 
the other locale to provide information, personally or 





























































































84 Investigatory Powers Tribunal 31 Jan 2017 (IPT/15/586/CH; 
IPT/16/448/CH). Note the Chief Constable of Cleveland Police was 
the respondent. This was one of the eight police forces that merged in 






















i. The police are accountable to the law 
ii. Accountability must be exercised in accordance with the law  
iii. Accountability structures should be governed by formal 
















85 K Murray ‘Stop and Search in Scotland: an evaluation of Police 
Practice’ (SCCJR Research Report 1/2014, 2014); K Murray ‘Stop and 
Search in Scotland: A Post Reform Overview – Scrutiny and 
Accountability’ (SCCJR Research Report 6/2015, 2015).  
86 See, e.g., L Adams ‘Police questioned on search tactics’ (The Herald, 
18 Jan 2014). 
87 HMICS ‘Audit and assurance review of stop and search: phase 1’ 
(HMICS 2015).  
88 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016.  
89 See, e.g. ‘The European Code of Police Ethics’ (Council of Europe 
















































90 It became subject to the Act in 2011 under the Freedom of 
Information (Designation as Public Authorities) Order 2011/2598.  

































- Clarity of oversight 
- Clarity of expectations 
- Clarity of expression 







92 HMIC ‘Stop and search powers: Are the police using them 
effectively and fairly?’ (HMIC 2013).  
93 HMIC ‘Stop and search powers 2: Are the Police Using them 
Effectively and Fairly?’ (HMIC 2015). 
94 See HMIC ‘PEEL: Police legitimacy 2015’ (HMIC 2015); HMIC ‘Best 
Use of Stop and Search (BUSS) Scheme’ (HMIC 2016).  







- wastes police’ and oversight bodies’ resources 
- creates unneeded complexities which obfuscate the objectives 
of accountability and undermine the Principle of Transparency, 
and 





































































































































97 See further Lewis & Evans Undercover: The true story of Britain’s secret 
police (Guardian Faber, 2013) and the Guardian blog: ‘Undercover, 
with Rob Evans and Paul Lewis’ 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/undercover-with-paul-lewis-
and-rob-evans>. 
98 Pitchfork ‘Inquiry into undercover policing’.   
99 Malik 2016 










































































































































104 Garvin, D. (1993) Building a Learning Organisation, Harvard 


































































































1. the “subordinate or obedient” sense – incorporating the 




2. the “explanatory and cooperative” sense - being answerable for 
what they do/fail to do and cooperating with the processes of 






“[The parties] believe it essential that policing structures and arrangements 
are such that the police service is professional, effective and efficient, fair 
and impartial, free from partisan political control; accountable, both under 
the law for its actions and to the community it serves; representative of the 
society it polices, and operates within a coherent and cooperative criminal 
justice system, which conforms with human rights norms. [….] these 
structures and arrangements must be capable of maintaining law and order 
including responding effectively to crime and to any terrorist threat and to 
public order problems. A police service which cannot do so will fail to win 
public confidence and acceptance. […]  any such structures and 
arrangements should be capable of delivering a policing service, in 
constructive and inclusive partnerships with the community at all levels, and 
with the maximum delegation of authority and responsibility, consistent 
with the foregoing principles. These arrangements should be based on 
principles of protection of human rights and professional integrity and 
should be unambiguously accepted and actively supported by the entire 
community”  
 
It is difficult to think of a more complete and compelling introduction to the 
subject of accountable policing. 
	
International Framework 
The starting point for the Principles is the international framework by which 
participating States have undertaken to uphold the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of their citizens, to set out the minimum standards for their 
policing bodies and to provide effective remedies and redress when they fall 
short of those standards.  The major international legal instruments that 
create rights for citizens and policing obligations on their parent States are 
considered below. 
While this framework and the standards it inculcates are drafted to address 
the activities of ‘law enforcement officers’ (LEO) the individual actions of 
whom are, of course, critical to aspects of accountability (see e.g. Reiner 
1992; Holdaway 1984) the framework sits above both the individual actions 
of all officials carrying out policing functions (originally more about 
‘peacekeeping than law enforcement – Banton 1964) and the more 
discursive proliferation of obligations and undertakings engaged by policing 
	
106 Para 1.9 
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in collaborations and partnerships.  The European Code of Police Ethics107 
expressly recognises108 that “most European police organisations – in 
addition to upholding the law – are performing social as well as service 
functions in society” while a College of Policing study published in 2015 
indicated that non-crime related incidents account for 83% of all recorded 
incidents dealt with by the police in England and Wales.  To this extent, to 
categorising policing as ‘law enforcement’ is like describing fire and rescue 
services as ‘fire extinguishers’. 
	




































108 At p.5 
109	and	one	that	is	corroborated	by	the	common	law	duty	for	citizens	to	come	to	the	assistance	of	
a	constable	in	England	&	Wales 
110	General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979 
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The Commentary to art 1 defines ‘law enforcement officials’ as including all 
officers of the law who exercise police powers, especially the powers of 
arrest or detention and the subsequent Guidelines provide that  “The 
definition of law enforcement officials shall be given the widest possible 
interpretation”111.  The developing role of non-sworn staff in delivering 
policing outcomes means that the concept of an LEO is too narrow a focus 
for true accountability and, even with the expansive wording of the 
Guidance, the Code itself requires teleological amendment in national 
instruments. The Code nevertheless underscores both the nature of law 
enforcement activities (which here include any such activity by the State’s 
armed forces) and the importance of conspicuously regulating the interface 
between those activities and the rights of citizens.   
 
Article 2 expressly identifies an overarching obligation on law enforcement 
officials to  respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold 
those human rights of all persons in the performance of their duty, while the 
Commentary goes on to identify and incorporate some particular rights 
enshrined within international instruments that LEO are under a duty to 
respect and protect.  These are: 
















113	Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 
entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx 
114 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 3452 (XXX) of 9 December 1975 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/DeclarationTorture.aspx 
115 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly 
resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965 
entry into force 4 January 1969, in accordance with Article 19 
https://ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx 
116 G.A. res. 3068 (XXVIII)), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), 
1015 U.N.T.S. 243, entered into force July 18, 1976  
117	Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General 
Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948Entry into force: 12 January 





The European Convention on Human Rights  
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, drawn up within the Council of Europe in 1950120 is probably the 
most well-known instrument in the international framework.  Often referred 
to as the European Convention on Human Rights this seminal post-WW2 
undertaking by signatory States has been at the heart of some of the most 
important legal decisions and judgments around policing accountability in 
recent years.  Rehearsing and reinforcing many of the rights and freedoms 
set out elsewhere in the framework supra, the Convention has provided an 
avenue of challenge and redress in a whole spectrum of policing activity 
from the use of lethal force, arrest and detention, the use of torture and 
inhumane treatment and the retention of DNA samples121.  The provisions of 
the Convention are directly relevant to the Principles.  
   
European Code of Police Ethics  
This Code was adopted by the European Council in September 2001 and sets 
out in some detail a series of elements and features that should exist in an 
ethical policing service, for example the training of officers, the conduct of 
suspect interviews and the provision of assistance to victims of crime.  The 
Code is highly relevant to several of the Principles and of particular 







15. The police shall enjoy sufficient operational independence 
from other state bodies in carrying out its given police tasks, 









118 Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the 
Economic and Social Council by its resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 





121 Ireland v UK [1978] ECHR 5310/71; McCann & Ors v UK  [1995] ECHR 18984/91; S & 



















The Code takes account of a significant amount of prior work on 
accountability including that of the European Committee for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), the 
principles within the European Social Charter with regard to the social and 
economic rights of police personnel, the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (Venice Commission) and the Declaration on the Police122.  
These are reflected in the Principles. 
 
National framework 
The international framework and the various individual rights nested within 
it are given further effect by a range of national instruments enacted by the 
relevant legislatures of the sovereign party States123.   These domestic 
regulations in the jurisdictions represented on the Group cover a very wide 
range of policing activities, from the use of force against people and their 
property, processing of citizens’ biometric and other personal data to the 
management of covert human intelligence sources and the disclosure of 
material in advance of prosecution.  These detailed measures in primary and 
secondary legislation are supported by codes of ethics and conduct in each 
of the jurisdictions considered by the Group124 along with statutory and 
professional guidance emanating from such bodies as the National Police 
Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing. 








do/Ethics/Documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf accessed 24 June 2019 
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In each of the police services within the Group’s jurisdiction police officers 
are required to attest or make a solemn declaration the wording of which 
expressly binds them to upholding the rights of citizens and to observing the 






















































125 A recent report that helpfully separates some of these component parts is The Future of 
Policing in IrelandSeptember 2018  
http://policereform.ie/en/POLREF/The%20Future%20of%20Policing%20in%20Ireland(web)










































































































































o Systemic: Top down using hierarchical sets of rules 
o Prudential: Bottom-up supervision of the sector and  
o Conduct of business: Regulation of how institutions 











• The Government ‘safety net’ particularly if organisations are 
considered too big or too important to fail. 
• Political considerations make regulation complex. 
• ‘Agency capture’ whereby those regulating come from the 
same background as those who are being regulated tend to 









































• Healthcare is the responsibility of Westminster and devolved 
administrations (not local government) 
• It is a highly complex and closely regulated environment 
similar to policing 
• The medical profession also has a political influence and can 
affect discourses (for instance junior doctors’ strikes).  
• Social care is the responsibility of the local government and is 
funded by both public and private sector 
• Accountability generally means answerability to external to 
organisations both horizontally and vertically.  Governance is 
more about internal processes and procedures but also includes 
internal accountability  (Wakefield and Fleming 2009) for things 
























• Electoral: Ministers and councillors are accountable through the 
electorate. 
• Scrutiny: Health and Care Scrutiny Committees, public scrutiny 
in Parliament, local authorities, Audit bodies, Ombudsman, 
user bodies and community health wards. 
• Managerial: Performance management and KPIs. 
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• Contractual: Commissioning and monitoring between public 
bodies and independent sector.  
• Regulation: Standards-based inspections with or without 






• What are the processes of external-internal and horizontal-
vertical accountability? 
• What role should the non-executives play?  What is the proper 
role for lay people? 







The Principles  
	




































































127 THE INDEPENDENT POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION 
(COMPLAINTS AND MISCONDUCT) (CONTRACTORS) 
REGULATIONS 2015 (SI 41/22015) 
128 s.6 which extends the Act’s provisions to persons ‘certain of whose functions are of a 
public nature’ -  see Yarls Wood Immigration Ltd. & Ors v Bedfordshire Police Authority  [2009] 












In terms of governance arrangements the Group saw tension arising in 
relation to the appointments of board members and queried the extent to 
which these ought to be Ministerial or Parliamentary appointments.  It was 
noted how, in NI, the Republic of Ireland and Scotland board members on 
police authorities are appointed by ministers while the Chair is also likely to 
have their own preferences “rubber stamped” by the Minister.  While this 
element of sign-off is a necessary consequence of wider RACI131 models 
applicable within public bodies generally, quaere the effect that this link with 
the executive administration may have on the public perception of 
independence.   Moreover, where the accountability is exercised by an IPCB, 
the recommended model is for each police ombudsman or complaints 
commissioner to be appointed by and answerable to a legislative assembly 
or a committee of elected representatives that does not have express 
responsibilities for the delivery of policing services.132  More specifically, if a 
board member has a specialist background, there is a risk of generating 
tensions between the board and the executive, particularly if the board 
members become intrusive in the day-to-day functioning of the executive; 
people bringing their own perspectives can skew the governance and 
oversight.  Further, in terms of board composition, it was agreed that 
members with political knowledge or ex-police officers may be justified in 
certain cases where they complement the knowledge requirements of a 
given area but whether it is reasonable – or even possible - to expect people 
who are inherently partial or partisan to act impartially while serving on a 








129 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, s.1 and sched 2 
130 the definition used in the Opinion of the European Human Rights Commissioner Concerning 
Independent and Effective Determination of Complaints Against the Police 12 March 2009 CommDH 
(2009)4 
131 an accepted model whereby roles are identified within a decision-making process as being 
Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed 













































133 the elections used a preferential voting system 
134	The	electoral	response	to	mainstream	parties	post	Brexit	experience	will	be	interesting	in	
May	2020	when	the	PCCs	are	elected	for	a	third	time.	











































136 Open Meeting before the House of Representatives sub committee on international 
















“The police objective of upholding the rule of law encompasses two distinct 
but interrelated duties: the duty of upholding the properly enacted and 
constituted law of the state, including securing a general condition of public 
tranquillity, and the related duty of keeping strictly within prescribed powers, 
abstaining from arbitrary action and respecting the individual rights and 














The Code goes on to identify the second aspect of legality:- 
“Above all, the rule of law requires that those who make, adjudicate and 
apply the law should be subject to that same law. In other words, the police 
should be subject to the self-same law that they apply and uphold. It is the 
mark of the police in a fully-fledged and mature democracy that they bind 
and subject themselves to the very law that they are pledged to uphold.”   
 
This part is concerned primarily with the areas engaged by oversight and 
regulation, those falling within the jurisdiction of IPCB and the Principles 
under Conduct (infra).  It is important to note that there is, within the 
jurisdictions considered by the Group, no equivalent of ‘Law Enforcement 
Officers’ Bills of Rights’ such as exist in a number of States in the USA 
(Keenan & Walker, 2005) and the law applies to police personnel in the same 
way as it does to anyone else.  In short this Principle apprehends the levels 
of accountability (democratic, personal and criminal) identified by the House 
of Representatives sub committee on international operations and human 




139 loc cit.  
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CONDUCT  
“The police role in upholding and safeguarding the rule of law is so important 
that the condition of a democracy can often be determined just by examining 











• Independence: there should not be institutional or hierarchical 
connections between the investigators and the officer complained 
against and there should be practical independence;  
• Adequacy: the investigation should be capable of gathering evidence 
to determine whether police behaviour complained of was unlawful 
and to identify and punish those responsible;  
• Promptness: the investigation should be conducted promptly and in 
an expeditious manner in  
order to maintain confidence in the rule of law;  
• Public scrutiny: procedures and decision-making should be open and 
transparent in order to ensure accountability; and  
• Victim involvement: the complainant should be involved in the 
complaints process in order to safeguard his or her legitimate 
interests.  
	















140 European Code of Police Ethics at p.18 
141 Human Rights Commissioner’s opinion concerning independent and effective determination of 









This approach is reflective of the European Police Oversight Principles142 
drafted after the EPAC Annual Conference in Budapest, Hungary in 2006 by a 
working group to develop minimum standards for organisations involved in 
the independent oversight of policing.  While the European principles’ 
primary frame of reference is of that element of accountability concerned 
with effective mechanisms for addressing cases of alleged misconduct, they 
seek generally to promote the highest standards in policing and bring 
about143: 
• ︎  greater public confidence in policing;  
• ︎  effective redress for those who are victims of police misconduct;  
• ︎  greater openness and understanding of policing by citizens;   
• ︎  greater respect for the law, policing and as a consequence 
reductions in  
criminality and disorder.  
	









As has already been seen, accountability means different things to different 
people in different settings.  The Group noted “a conflation of confusion 
between performance management and accountability”.  Whether 
described as governance, oversight or regulation, the facets of accountability 
and the extent to which they constructively balance democratic 
answerability against the necessary direction-and-control freedoms of chief 







142 The European Police Oversight Principles  
https://igp.gouvernement.lu/dam-assets/service/attributions/police-oversight-principles.pdf 














































144 R (OTAO) Crompton loc cit. 
145	Report	of	The	Independent	Commission	on	Policing	for	Northern	Ireland	loc	cit.para	6.19-6.20	
 
146 The Future of Policing in Ireland September 2018 loc cit.   











































“Caught red handed: Why we can’t count on police recorded crime statistics” Report of the Public 
Administration Select Committee 13th session 2013/14 HC 760, The Stationery Office, London; 
Report of HM Inspector of Constabulary into the reliability of crime recording data created 
and maintained by the police forces of England and Wales May 2014 





















































































































• The Principles need to be contextual and need to be adapted 
and applied in different contexts to reflect the dynamic nature 
of policing. 
• How people react to inspection and reports needs to be 
reviewed.  
• Regulators need to be properly trained.  Mere disclosure of 
information to fulfil a legal obligation is not sufficient - the 
‘regulators’ need to be able to understand the information that 
is being presented.  
• At the moment the different agencies within the criminal justice 
system seem to be working in silos; there needs to be an 
integrated approach as that is what the taxpayers are concerned 
with. Boundaries lead to gaps between problem identification 
and problem resolution. In NI, the Criminal Justice System 
Inspection provides that holistic oversight. 
• There needs to be proactive regulation and clear rules of 
engagement between the police and the regulatory body with 
complete transparency. 
	
































In taking forward this Principle the political risk of an evidence-driven approach and 
the barriers to independent evaluation in public bodies generally should be noted 
(Rutter, 2012), such barriers include: 
• Timeliness of research  
• Suitability of issues to rigorous testing and policies often not being designed 
in a way that allows proper evaluation 
• Lack of usable data.  
 
But the most stubborn areas of resistance might be the ‘demand barriers’ 
(Rutter151) emanating from both incentives and culture among senior decision-
makers.  
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